

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE 5 Junr 1998	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis 4 August 1997-5 June 1998	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Command Crisis: Influence of Command Culture on the Allied defeat at Suvla Bay		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Stuart K. Archer, USAF			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, ATTN: ATZL-SWD-G Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-1352		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
<p>13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)</p> <p>The IX Corps of the British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) achieved a complete tactical surprise of the Turkish defenders with its landings on 6 August 1915. Yet, despite a huge superiority in resources and a ten-to-one advantage in men, the IX Corps failed to obtain its planned objectives. This study examines the extent that the outcome of the British failure was influenced by the prevalent British Army command culture.</p> <p>The British Army command culture of 1916 was directly linked to its past as a colonial police force. Although well suited for that role, it was unable to effectively deal with the changes in warfare and the rapidly expanding sizes of armies in 1916. The British command culture of the time consisted of a personalized system that exercised a reliance on a system of seniority, a hands-off method of command at the senior and operational levels, and a restrictive method of control at the tactical level.</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Command Culture, Suvla Bay, Sir Ian Hamilton		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 109 16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified

COMMAND CRISIS: INFLUENCE OF COMMAND
CULTURE ON THE ALLIED DEFEAT
AT SUVLA BAY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

STUART K. ARCHER, MAJ, USAF
B.S., The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, 1985
M.B.A., Louisiana Technical University, Ruston, Louisiana, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

COMMAND CRISIS: THE INFLUENCE OF COMMAND CULTURE ON THE ALLIED DEFEAT AT SUVLA BAY, by Maj Stuart K. Archer, USAF, 109 pages.

The IX Corps of the British Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) achieved a complete tactical surprise of the Turkish defenders with its landing on 6 August 1915. Yet, despite a huge superiority in resources and a ten-to-one advantage in men, the IX Corps failed to obtain its planned objectives. This study examines the extent that the outcome of the British failure was influenced by the prevalent British Army command culture.

The British Army command culture of 1916 was directly linked to its past as a colonial police force. Although well suited for that role, it was unable to effectively deal with the changes in warfare and the rapidly expanding sizes of armies in 1916. The British command culture of the time consisted a personalized system that exercised a reliance on a system of seniority, a hands-off method of command at the senior and operational levels, and a restrictive method of control at the tactical level.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thanks to Lt Col Stephenson for his encouragement and assistance in ensuring this was a quality product. Thanks also to Dr. George Gawrych and Major Keith Bartsch for their excellent insight and their emphasis on quality and accuracy. And finally, many thanks to my family who, with their support and encouragement allowed me to complete this endeavor.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ADC	Aide-de-camp
ANZAC	Australian and New Zealand Army Corps
BG	Brigadier General
GHQ	General Headquarters
MEF	Mediterranean Expeditionary Force

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Allied Dardanelles campaign was a bold and imaginative effort to open a second and decisive front in the Great War. The campaign significantly influenced both political and military affairs in the Mediterranean and actually held the potential to influence the outcome of the entire war. Unfortunately for the Allied forces of France, Britain, and Australia, the campaign lapsed into a disastrous and humbling loss. Originally conceived as an exclusively naval expedition, the Dardanelles campaign rapidly fell into a brutal trench warfare that ended with the tremendous loss of Allied lives. During the campaign, the Allies attempted to break the three-month deadlock with a creative and ambitious amphibious assault on the Suvla Bay area of the Gallipoli peninsula. The assault at Suvla Bay was a disastrous failure and was so unsuccessful that it ultimately convinced the Allies to abandon the entire Dardanelles campaign. The losses for the Allies were staggering. During the 259 days between the first landings in April 1915 and the final withdrawal from Gallipoli in January 1916, the Allies incurred over 252,000 casualties out of the 500,000 men they committed to the campaign.¹ In the end, instead of influencing the outcome of the war, the Dardanelles became a secondary and ineffectual side effort and its only one real accomplishment was that it seriously reduced British prestige and power in the Mediterranean.

Over time, numerous authors have cited the lack of creativity, the failure to adapt, and the general mismanagement of the campaign by senior leaders as key reasons for the

Allied failure. Other critical factors such as lack of adequate preparation and planning, lack of artillery, inadequate supplies, and poorly trained troops, have also been examined as root causes for the failure. However, this study will focus on the command culture, particularly influences of the British command culture on the campaign's failure. Specifically, this study seeks to determine if the campaign's failure was due to Allied commander's personal leadership and command style or were more inherent and systematic problems in the British command culture to blame? Given identical circumstances, would another British commander fared any better, or would he have been victim to the same problems that plagued the original Allied commander? This study will also briefly explore and analyze the prevailing command culture of the German-led Turkish command and its significance in the Allied defeat as a point of comparison.

The majority of the literature and research on the Dardanelles' failure has centered on the initial southern peninsula landings and the ensuing months of unimaginative and unsuccessful methodical assaults against strong Turkish defenses. In contrast, this study will focus on the unsuccessful Suvla Bay landing and the inability of the Allies to end the peninsula deadlock. The Suvla Bay operation is of critical importance to the campaign because of its unique potential to break the stalemate and allow the Allies to obtain their original objectives. A critical analysis of the Suvla Bay operation is also important because the landings were an innovative amphibious assault against an unprotected enemy flank that caught the Turks and their German commanders in complete surprise. Further, Allied and German/Turkish leadership and strategy in the Suvla Bay landing needs to be

examined to determine to what extent the conduct of both the Allied and German commanders contributed to the Allied defeat.

This analysis of the leadership during the Suvla Bay landings will focus on the British and German command cultures of the early 1900s. Culture can be defined as “the sum total of ways of living built up by a group of human beings and transmitted from one generation to another”² Cultures, according to sociologist William Levin, typically contain four elements: (1) they are learned from previous generations; (2) ideas and concepts are broadly shared by members; (3) cultures are adaptive to the conditions in which people live in; (4) are symbolic in nature, certain symbols represent order and assist individuals in making sense of their world.³ Command may be defined according to Joint Publication 1-02 as, “The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.”⁴ Therefore, for the purposes of this study, command culture is defined as a body of thought or way of life shared by members of an institution and passed on to succeeding generations. Command culture contains the general essence of conduct, principles, and guidelines that exist within the command structure of a military establishment. It is the refinement of thought, habits and skills which reside in an institution and involves the practice of leadership and the interaction of commander and subordinate. Command culture establishes general standards for the

organizing, directing, coordinating, and decision making of the organization's command structure. With this definition, this study will seek to determine to what extent the command cultures played in influencing the thought, conduct, and decision making of the senior commanders of both the British and Turkish armies.

The author Martin Samuels suggests that the British command culture of the era was based on two contradictory systems of command. At the tactical level, a system of restrictive control had emerged as the predominant method of leadership. In restrictive control, subordinates are given orders which are very specific and detailed. All actions of subordinate leaders must be thoroughly planned and fully coordinated. Local initiative by subordinate commanders is unwelcome because it tends to disrupt the central plan. Details, timing, and strict adherence to the plan are seen as critical elements in the general conduct of any military operation. In contrast to the rigidity and inflexibility at the tactical level, the operational level of the British Army was characterized by a reluctance of senior commanders to interfere with any aspect of their subordinates' handling of affairs. Martin Samuels has termed this type of command style as "umpiring." He describes its essential character as excessive decentralization, especially at the division and corps level.⁵ Umpiring gave subordinate operational commanders excessive freedom to accomplish operations without the interference of a superior and actually made superiors reluctant to intervene, even when the subordinate commanders were ignoring or misinterpreting the senior commander's intent.

In comparison, the German Army and subsequently the German commanders of the Turkish army had incorporated a system of directive military command, which

devolved the control of the battle to subordinate commanders. Directive command was developed to allow for rapid action appropriate to the situation. Subordinates had to adapt to the local situation and were encouraged to exploit each and every opportunity to the full, always seeking to further the overall intent to the best of their ability, rather than just implementing orders from above. While this type of command did decentralize command at lower levels, it was only to be maintained as long as it assisted the achievement of the overall intent. When the actions of a subordinate interfered with the intent, commanders were obligated to step in and get their immediate subordinates back on course. In extreme circumstances, commanders could even take over personal command of subordinate units.⁶

The influence of these two differing command cultures is central to this study's examination of the Suvla Bay landings. This study will explore these systems and examine the influence both had on the outcome of Suvla Bay. The wider significance is that the command culture affected the Suvla Bay landings; it therefore was critical to the Allied failure in the entire Dardanelles campaign. If the command cultures played a significant role in both the victory and the defeat, then it is important to study to determine how similar cultures may affect wars and battles today.

The influence of the British command culture is most apparent in several significant incidents that link directly with the campaign's failure. The most significant centers upon the IX Corps Commander Sir Frederick Stopford. Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander of the Allied forces, had requested a capable and resourceful commander to command the Suvla Bay forces. Instead, he received Stopford, a retired general who had

never held a combat command. The British army was structured on the basis of strict adherence to seniority as the sole determinant for command. Subsequently, the only criterion used to distinguish Stopford from other more capable leaders was his seniority. Therefore, it was imperative for Hamilton to choose an individual who was senior to Lieutenant General Mahon, the 10th Division commander, over whom the new corps commander would have to command. The culture of the British placed more emphasis on seniority than on ability and this “cult of rank” limited Hamilton’s pool of available commanders. He accepted the appointment of Stopford with some reservations, but no opposition. A less passive officer might have pressed harder for an officer he felt suited to the difficult task at hand, but this was not in Hamilton’s nature, or common to the British Army where personal relationships and adherence to tradition were valued over ability and creativity.⁷

Another key influence of the British command culture was the subordinate relationship Hamilton had with Stopford. Hamilton was a seasoned combat veteran and aware of Stopford’s capabilities and his lack of command experience. Still, in a shining example of umpiring, Hamilton allowed Stopford a free reign in the affairs of the operation and failed to take action until it was too late. Stopford’s inherent misunderstanding of Hamilton’s intent, his failure to intervene with his division and brigade commanders, and his outright reluctance to leave his ship during the critical hours of the landing were all key factors in the operation’s failure. Stopford holds a large share of the blame for the failure at Suvla Bay, as does Hamilton, for failing to take steps to keep a close watchful eye on a general he suspected was not up to the task at hand.⁸

Other critical aspects of the command failure include the extent to which the performance of the division commanders and brigade commanders played in the operation. General Hammersley, in command of a “New Army” division, suffered from mental and physical exhaustion and was soon removed from command. General Mahon, the division commander whose seniority forced Hamilton to make his selection of Stopford, was still brooding from his assignment as a “mere” division commander. He would actually resign within two weeks after the landings in the midst of a major engagement because he was senior to the general that replaced Stopford as corps commander. The conduct of these two division commanders, their relationship with Stopford, and the reluctance of their brigade commanders to act appropriately, will be examined as key factors in the Suvla Bay failure.

This study’s analysis of the command culture and the Suvla Bay landings begins with an examination of the Dardanelles and the initial Allied landings in April 1915. The Dardanelles Straits are a strategically important narrow passage way that connects the Sea of Marmara with the then capital of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople (Figure 1). The total length of the passage from the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula is about forty-one miles and the entire distance of the waterway is dominated by the heights of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The straits widen and constrict from about five miles wide to only 1,600 yards at its most narrow point.⁹ The most identifiable features are the steep heights of the peninsula’s hills which provide for an almost perfect natural defense. Any attempt to seize the area would be a formidable task in any era. Even in classical times, the straits maintained significant strategic importance to European and Asian traders and especially




Figure 1. Dardanelles Area. Source: *Gallipoli*, Allan Moorehead.

to major sea powers in the Mediterranean. In sum, the Dardanelles are the strategic dividing line between Asia and Europe, and their control essentially means control into and out of the Black Sea.

The Allied expedition to control the Dardanelles was a direct result of the deadlock on the Western front.¹⁰ In the latter months of 1914, the Allied powers began to realize the war would be very costly and protracted. After only four months of war, the offensives in the West had ground to a halt, and the system of trench warfare was already in place. A cheaper and more expeditious way to influence the war was needed. Also in this early stage of the war, alliances were still being made and several smaller states in the Balkans were waiting to determine which side would develop the upper hand before they committed to an alliance. The major Balkan states, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Greece, all initially remained uncommitted to any alliance; and the alliance among Russia, France, and Britain was highly dependent upon the route of the Dardanelles. Over one-half of all Russian exports and nine-tenths of Russian grain passed through the Dardanelles. Thus, it was of great importance to the Allies to have the Balkan countries and especially Turkey, the owner of the Dardanelles, remain neutral or allied in the war.¹¹ If Turkey were not to remain neutral, an Allied campaign could possibly open a second front in the Mediterranean and influence the other Balkan countries to join the alliance.

Turkey, however, was rapidly and irrevocably falling into the hands of Germany. In 1913, Turkey had invited the Germans to assist with rebuilding their Ottoman Army after its disasters in the Balkans War. The Germans were very eager to help and essentially took over the administration and command of the Turkish army. By the end of

October 1914, Turkey accepted the overtures of Germany and joined the war on the German side.

The commitment of Turkey to the German side presented both a challenge and an opportunity for the Allies. In the early months of 1915, the British War Council was eager still to find alternative methods for success in the war and began to look to the Dardanelles to solve both diplomatic and strategic military problems.¹² Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, was the first major proponent of the Dardanelles campaign. He envisioned a quick naval victory over the Turkish forts guarding the Dardanelles followed by a British fleet sailing up the Sea of Marmara and shelling Constantinople. The hope was that the capture of the Dardanelles and the possible capture of Constantinople would not only encourage the other Balkan states to join an alliance against the Central Powers, but also create civil unrest and bring down the government of Turkey itself. A vigorous and successful campaign might also influence Italy and Rumania into a grand Christian alliance against Turkey in the Balkans.¹³ With these sublime possibilities, the British War Council gradually recognized the potential of the Dardanelles, and support for a campaign began to grow.

The British War Council at the time was dominated by Churchill and Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War. Kitchener was renowned for his military expertise and when he gave a decision it was invariably accepted as final. According to Churchill, Kitchener was rarely, if ever, overruled by the council or the cabinet. Additionally, inside the War Office his power was absolute and autocratic. By late 1914, the ablest and best generals and soldiers had been sent to France to command in the field and the General

Staff had been virtually disbanded.¹⁴ Once Churchill had convinced Kitchener of the need for the campaign, the stage was set for the rest of the War Council's acquiescence. The critical meeting of the War Council took place on 13 January, and there appears to have been very little discussion on the matter. Churchill explained the concept of the plan and Lord Kitchener, "thought the plan worth trying." The decision was made without a dissenting voice. The War Council would decree: "The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."¹⁵ In hindsight, the War Council woefully underestimated the preparations needed, the incredible difficulties of the terrain and defenses, and most importantly, the inherent difficulty of using naval forces alone to seize land based objectives.

After consultation with Admiral Carden, the commander of the naval forces in the Mediterranean, Churchill pressed forward and convinced the War Council to proceed with a naval assault. On 19 February, Carden began his attack with a force of twelve ships which included a French squadron. Bad weather hampered the initial assault and the attacks accomplished very little. Another attack on 18 March with Admiral De Robeck in command fared no better. After some initial success, three of the Allied battleships were sunk by mines and completely lost. De Robeck called off further attacks and pondered his next likely course of action. After the initial assault by Carden, Kitchener concluded that a naval assault was now unlikely to succeed without the use of substantial ground troops to assist in capturing the coastal defenses. At this point, the scheme changed irrevocably from a naval to a military operation, and its chances for success began to decline. In

retrospect, it is easy to comment after the event, for the Allied commanders had no certain knowledge of the Turks' parlous state of ammunition; but had a renewed naval assault been attempted in late March it very well could have succeeded.¹⁶

With some British forces readily available in Egypt, Kitchener rushed to commence the ground assault and appointed an old friend Sir Ian Hamilton to command the ground forces. The War Office dispatched Hamilton to the Mediterranean within a day of his notice of selection to command the Dardanelles campaign. Hamilton and his partial staff, being without an adjutant and quartermaster general, left on the fourteenth of March for the Mediterranean and arrived in time to be present for the naval engagement on the eighteenth. Before he departed, Hamilton received an estimate of approximately 40,000 Turkish soldiers on the peninsula, a handbook of the Turkish army, dated 1912, a prewar report on the Dardanelles defenses, and a map which was subsequently proved to be inaccurate.¹⁷ Strategic preparation and planning for the campaign were clearly absent, and rarely has such a modern major expedition been undertaken with so little preparation by its strategic and operational commanders.

Upon his arrival in theater, Hamilton assumed command of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force (MEF) consisting of a total of 75,000 men from the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), the Royal Naval Division, a French division, and the British 29th Division. Hamilton was to wait for orders from Kitchener before commencing any type of operation. Subsequently, while organizing his forces and waiting for orders from Kitchener, over a month elapsed between the naval bombardment in March and the initial landings on 25 April. The element of surprise was lost, giving the

Turkish troops ample time to organize and improve their defenses. In February 1915, only two Turkish divisions were Dardanelles area, but by the end of April there would be six.¹⁸

The Turkish forces on the peninsula were commanded by a highly experienced and capable German officer Liman von Sanders. Enver Pasha, the Turkish War Minister had just given von Sanders command of the Ottoman Fifth Army guarding the Dardanelles. At von Sanders' disposal were approximately 80,000 men organized in six divisions. General von Sanders began intensive training and erected what defenses he could during the critical lapse by the Allies. He stationed two divisions on the Asiatic Coast, where he believed the main threat existed and posted three divisions on the peninsula. He kept his last division, commanded by Mustafa Kemal, as a mobile reserve at Maidos and Boghali. These troops would be ready to reinforce the others depending on where the Allies landed.¹⁹ Although he misjudged the Allies initial landing objective, von Sanders effectively used the extra month he had before the invasion to reorganize the peninsula's defenses.

Hamilton, on the other hand, was faced with the more formidable task of planning for the offensive and organizing his troops for the invasion. Somehow he was able to accomplish this and planned an aggressive amphibious assault on the southern tip of the peninsula. Hamilton developed a plan for three main landings: a diversionary landing by the French division at Kum Kale, the main thrust by the British 29th division at Cape Helles, and a supporting effort by the ANZAC at Ari Burnu. The original objectives were to establish a wide beachhead at Ari Burnu, occupy the entire tip of the Helles Peninsula, and then take the vital high ground overlooking the beaches. The operation had the

possibility to be a magnificent amphibious assault; however, from the onset, the assault was characterized by gross confusion and miscommunication.

The assault commenced early on the morning of 25 April and encountered grave difficulties from the start. The men disembarking at Cape Helles from the *SS River Clyde*, an old collier modified for the landing, were systematically slaughtered. Other operations along Cape Helles met with similar fates. After heavy fighting at the other beaches, men gradually made it ashore and secured small portions of the beaches and cliffs. After a full day of heavy fighting, the Allies barely managed a precarious toehold on the tip of the southern peninsula.

In the early dawn at Ari Burnu, the ANZAC, under the command of General William Birdwood landed from their small craft without mishap. The first troops landing had landed a mile north of their intended point, and due to the rugged and inhospitable terrain, communication and control were difficult to maintain. This made coordinated advances impossible and confusion reigned as isolated skirmishes developed. Had the ANZAC been able to organize and establish themselves forward on Sari Bair ridge and Chunuk Bair, they could have easily dominated the entire peninsula. However, into this fighting came Mustafa Kemal and his 19th Division. Without authority, Kemal ordered up all the forces he could muster and counterattacked the ANZAC. This stabilized the Turkish position and prevented the capture of the Sari Bair ridge, and quite possibly, decided the entire campaign.²⁰ At one point, General Birdwood suggested his ANZAC forces be evacuated due to the narrow beachhead and the dogged fighting. In response, Hamilton ordered him to stick it out and ended his message with the now infamous post

script: "You have got through the difficult business, now you have only to dig, dig, dig, until you are safe."²¹ Hamilton's small order to "dig, dig, dig" was to set in motion the type of fighting that would characterize the entire battle for the ensuing eight months. A stalemate characteristic of the fighting in France soon took hold over the entire conflict, and despite repeated offenses, neither side was able to force a decision. The numerous bloody offensives accomplished little and merely succeeded in decimating the soldiers on both sides of the trenches.

The devastating losses on the southern peninsula convinced Kitchener to approve a major reinforcement of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. With these new reinforcements, Hamilton decided to land a force at Suvla Bay, five miles north of the ANZAC's beachhead. Suvla Bay was only lightly defended and only four miles of terrain needed to be crossed before reaching the high ground. If this were to occur, then the Turkish right flank could be turned, and a breakout from the ANZAC bridgehead could occur. Unfortunately again, the Suvla Bay landings suffered from some of the same problems that plagued the April landings. The landings began on 6 August and succeeded in getting men ashore, but lack of communication, unspecified objectives, and inept leadership doomed the attack. The heights around Tekke Tepe and Kiretch Tepe were not taken even though there were literally no defenders. Two days would elapse before a coordinated effort inland was made. This critical delay gave the Turks precious time to move in position and set up defenses on the heights. The momentum of the new assault was lost, and the British were unable to capture the heights.

This loss put the troops in the same situation they faced on the southern edge of the peninsula, and it led to another four months of stalemate. Lack of success in the Suvla Bay landings eventually prompted Hamilton's removal from command and convinced the Allies to abandon all attempts in the Dardanelles. In contrast to the amphibious landings, the Allies departed the peninsula in a highly successful amphibious evacuation in January 1916 without the loss of a single soldier.

In conclusion, the Dardanelles campaign was born out of political intrigue and rushed into action without sufficient preparation. The ill-conceived naval assault failed as well as the ill-planned ground campaign. The Allies last ditch effort to save the campaign with the Suvla Bay landings also failed and the entire campaign abandoned. Two distinct command cultures were evident between the opposing sides of the Dardanelles campaign, and this thesis will examine further both the command cultures in detail and seek to determine the significant role if any, they played in the Allied failure at Suvla Bay.

¹Allan Moorehead, *Gallipoli* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1956), 361. Total British casualties amounted to 205,000 including Killed in Action, missing, wounded, or captured. The remaining 47,000 casualties were from the French Corps. Actual British dead, missing, and died from diseases totaled 43,000. Aspinall-Oglander, *Official History*, 484. For precise breakdown by categories see 286-287, *Statistics of the Great War*. (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1922).

² *The Random House College Dictionary* (New York: Random House, Inc. 1980), 325.

³ William C. Levin, *Sociological Ideas* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991), 117-119.

⁴ DOD Dictionary, Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, DC: Joint Staff Publication, 1994), 109.

⁵ Martin Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914* (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 1995), 49-52.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

⁷ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 141. Most who served directly for Hamilton acknowledged his sensitivity, compassion, and overall good nature. He was known in the British Army not only as an intellectual, but also as a courageous and daring leader. In fact, his right hand was paralyzed from a hand-to-hand combat wound and he had seen more active service than almost any other active British general. His staff experience was just as wide. He served both as ADC to Roberts in India and as Military Secretary to Lord Kitchener in the Boer War. Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915*, 11. For an interesting look at Hamilton's life, see *The Happy Warrior: The Life of Sir Ian Hamilton*, by I.B.M. Hamilton.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 141. Sir Frederick Stopford enjoyed a successful career in the British Imperial Army but had never commanded in battle. He was primarily known for his administrative skills and most recognized for being Military Secretary to Redvers Buller during the first years of the Boer War. Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915*.

⁹ Brigadier-General C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1929), 31. The British had already experienced the disaster of the Ypres and by December 1914 had already lost over 90,000 of the original 160,000 men sent to the western front. The British prewar professional army had virtually ceased to exist. Samuels, *Dogma and Doctrine*, 150.

¹⁰ Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915 Frontal Assault on Turkey* (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1991), 6.

¹¹ Trumball Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles* (Wesport Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc. 1977), (Originally published by the Macmillan Company, New York 1963), 90.

¹² Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War*, 134. Britain was eager to help Russia as they were encountering great difficulties on the eastern front. The Turkish expedition into the Caucasus mountains in late 1914 met with disaster, but still constituted a significant concern to Russia. Lord Kitchener had in effect promised Grand Duke Nicholas a "demonstration" of some kind to relieve pressure from the Turks. An excellent but somewhat prejudiced view of the political maneuverings and the evolution of the campaign from naval expedition to ground assault is outlined in Winston Churchill's *The World Crisis 1915*.

¹³ Ibid., 134.

¹⁴ Moorehead, *Gallipoli*, 43. The prewar British officer corps consisted of only 12,738 Regular Officers and at the end of 1914, 3,627 had already become casualties. Samuels, *Dogma and Doctrine*, 151. The majority of quality officers serving in the war office had been sent to western front by the end of 1914. Consequently, Kitchener was able to exert almost dictatorial powers in his position as War Secretary. Kitchener also brandished power by his broad appeal to the British public. Despite the government's growing discontent with his performance, he remained extremely popular up until his death aboard the *Hampshire* in 1916.

¹⁵ Ibid., 40.

¹⁶ Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915 Frontal Assault on Turkey*, 33. Admiral Carden led the initial assaults in late February with generally good success, however, by mid March 1915 he was overcome by the strain and relinquished command to Admiral de Robeck. De Robeck has often been criticized for failing to pursue the offensive after his attack on 18 March. The Allied force lost three capital ships and three others were heavily damaged. Critics have argued that six new ships were already steaming forward to join de Robeck's fleet and when coupled with the damage that the British did to the Turkish forts charge that another attack may very well have succeeded. In hindsight, this rings true as the Turks were down to less than eight shells per heavy gun. Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, 1927, 79. However, the loss of the three ships was devastating not only to de Robeck's small fleet but to the British Navy and British prestige as well. Instead of risking another attack, de Robeck asked for assistance to force the Strait.

¹⁷ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol I*, 90.

¹⁸ Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915 Frontal Assault on Turkey*, 37. Only two Turkish divisions were available for defense prior to 25 February 1915. The *Official Turkish History* points out that it would have been "easy to have landed on the peninsula and capture the strait" with such inadequate Turkish defenses. *Official Turkish History of the Gallipoli Campaign*, 1928, 15. It further points out that the strait could have easily been forced in the three months between the declaration of war and the first naval attack in February 1915. An interesting side note is that the government of Greece had actually offered up three infantry divisions for Allied use at Gallipoli on 1 March 1915. However, the Russians, fearing the spread of Greek influence in the area objected to their use and the offer was withdrawn.

¹⁹ Ibid., 37. The typical Turkish division at the time consisted of three infantry regiments, each with three infantry battalions, a machine gun company, a Field Artillery Regiment of two companies, a pioneer company, a sanitary company, and a squadron of cavalry. Total number of troops was between 10,000 and 12,000 men. Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, 940.

²⁰ Ibid., 40. Both von Sanders and Kannengiesser appreciate the initiative and audacity of Mustafa Kemal on 25 April 1915. Kemal was awakened by the naval gunfire on 25 April. After two hours of waiting for reports that did not come, he went personally with a detachment of his division to view the situation for himself. He quickly recognized the importance of the heights around Sari Bair Ridge and ordered the counterattacks that prevented its capture. See von Sanders' *Five Years in Turkey* and the *Official Turkish History*.

²¹ Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary Vol I* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920). The ANZAC bridgehead was less than 3,500 yards wide and less than 1,200 yards deep. General Birdwood's assumption that another Turkish counterattack could push him into the sea was correct. However, he had no way of knowing that the Turkish forces under Mustafa Kemal were in no position to conduct a counterattack. Almost completely exhausted, they too had been devastated by the fighting and had already suffered 2,000 casualties. Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915*, 30.

CHAPTER 2

SUVLA BAY

The long and varied annals of the British Army contain no more heart-breaking episode than that of the battle of Suvla Bay. The greatness of the prize in view, the narrowness by which it was missed, the extremes of valiant skill and of incompetence, of effort and inertia, which were equally presented, the malevolent fortune which played about the field, are features not easily to be matched in our history.¹

Winston S. Churchill, *The World Crisis 1915*

On 7 August 1915, twenty-two British battalions consisting of over 20,000 men were landed at Suvla Bay. Their task was to reach a low line of hills between two and five miles inland. Opposing them was a token force of 1,500 Turkish gendarmes under the command of a German cavalry officer. Despite a huge superiority in men, equipment, naval gun support, and the virtual lack of Turkish entrenchments, the British completely failed to achieve their objective. Had the British been successful and not systematically squandered away their advantage, the war in the East, and the entire World War might have been very different.²

The Suvla Bay landing comprised an audacious and daring effort by the Allies to resolve the campaign's stalemate on the southern tip of the peninsula. Less than three weeks after the first Gallipoli landings in April, another landing to recapture the original objectives was already being considered. The Allied commanders of the MEF still retained a measure of optimism that the campaign could be salvaged with a combination of more troops, supplies, and artillery. They reasoned some type of bold maneuver could be used

to break through some lightly defended area of the peninsula making the original objectives much easier to obtain. The maneuvers being considered included a landing at Enos or north of Bulair, a landing on the Asiatic shore, a large assault from Birdwood's Anzac Cove position, and another effort from the south. Eventually, the large attack from the Anzac Cove position would be chosen but would be in conjunction with a new landing of equal importance just north of Anzac Cove at Suvla Bay. The plan for the offensive would be highly dependent on surprise and timing, but its initial objectives seemed easily obtainable. The plan required the seizure of the high ground around the bay before the Turks could employ their reserves. Actual execution of the plan would have to be managed with precise and clockwork like efficiency. Unfortunately for the British, the execution of the Suvla Bay landings revealed the worst aspects of the command culture of its Army and conversely some of the best of its adversary. The command flexibility and adaptation to the situation by the German leaders, and consequently, the complete absence of it by the British, resulted in the complete failure of the entire British campaign.

By the beginning of May, the difficulties and hardships the MEF had experienced in three weeks of fighting erased any notion that Gallipoli was an easy endeavor. Hamilton admitted to Kitchener on 8 May 1915, that "the result of the operation has been failure, as my object remains unachieved."³ Hamilton was already in dire need of replacements just to maintain his position on the southern tip of the peninsula. Public support and confidence for the Dardanelles campaign were low and many British officials were opposed to sending more troops. Kitchener had been under constant assault from critics of the Dardanelles campaign and was managing a delicate balance between the

Dardanelles and the Western front. Like most in the British government, Kitchener himself considered the Gallipoli campaign less important than the Western front and remained reluctant to take forces away from there to send to the expedition in the Dardanelles. Kitchener remained in a quandary, however, because he had publicly supported the Dardanelles campaign from its inception.⁴ Hamilton cabled on 14 May and explained that he believed only two divisions would be needed if other allies joined the fighting, if not, then four divisions would be required to obtain the original objectives. Kitchener's reply was that Hamilton was to only receive one division until the war council determined the overall fate of the expedition. Kitchener advised Hamilton to continue his efforts at "hammering away" in an effort to break the Turkish resolve.⁵



Political pressure on Kitchener steadily increased after the poor results of the original landings. Soon after the landings in April, a political shakeup occurred in the British government, and a "Dardanelles Committee" was set up to assume the duties of the old War Council. The new committee's charter was to determine whether the entire Dardanelles campaign should continue. In early June the committee discussed the situation and agreed to send a four-division force consisting of one territorial division and three "New Army" divisions. The committee's rationale was based on the premise that four divisions would not make a significant difference on the Western front, but could well, if Hamilton was correct, carry the Dardanelles campaign to victory.⁶ In hindsight, had this approach been used in the April landings, the entire campaign could have easily changed for an extra division could have swung the balance for the Allies in late April.

Although Hamilton originally planned to use the new divisions to continue attacks through the Helles and Anzac areas, the idea of a new front greatly appealed to him. The appeal grew after he was given a draft of a surprise movement north of Anzac Cove against the heights of Sari Bair. The bold proposal included a surprise night attack and provided the chance of striking the enemy in an area with no trenches. The plan also generated interest because the “hammering away” strategy of the Helles forces under General Alymer Hunter-Weston was having no success. The costly and unsuccessful June fourth battle for Krithia finally convinced Hamilton to completely abandon frontal assaults and seek a different, innovative solution to the stalemate.⁷ The new landings presented a greater opportunity for an amphibious assault because Hamilton and the General Headquarters were much more knowledgeable of the Turkish situation, the terrain, and the environment. Optimistically, a successful landing at Suvla Bay could possibly achieve in one assault what the vicious and inconclusive fighting of several months had failed to accomplish.

General Birdwood conceived the original idea for the attack and his letter of 13 May outlined the potential of launching a main attack from the Anzac position. The central premise of his new offensive was to seize the heights of Chunuk Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe (Hill 305) by a turning movement of the Anzac left flank. The plan first called for seizure of the Sair Bair ridge by a night surprise attack and then the envelopment of Hill 305. General Birdwood estimated 22,000 troops would be required to complete the operation. After these initial objectives, Birdwood further proposed to attack and occupy Gun Ridge which dominated the center of the peninsula. The proposal

was strongly supported at General Headquarters where the advantage of capturing Chunuk Bair would guarantee the weakly defended coast line at Suvla would immediately fall into British hands. Additionally, the possession of Suvla Bay would ensure a safe harbor for winter supplies. An enthusiastic and optimistic Hamilton directed Birdwood to work out more details for a plan and to do it with the utmost secrecy.⁸

Birdwood's plan originally consisted of a night offensive from Anzac Cove and included the capture of Chunuk Bair, Battleship Hill, Baby 700, 400 Plateau, and then the capture of Gun Ridge the next morning. Hamilton's GHQ identified the essential weakness of the original plan as the reality that the success of the entire operation depended upon the success of the first phase. Additionally, the number of men that could be employed through the small Anzac Cove beachhead was extremely limited and surprise was the critical element in the operation. Therefore, troops would have to be added to the position secretly before the operation was to commence. Also, the offensive was planned for conditions in July and another month's delay could allow the Turks to substantially improve their defenses on the Anzac northern flank.⁹ The GHQ concluded the entire plan could be strengthened if a new landing north or south of Anzac Cove could be effected in conjunction with a breakout from the Anzac position. In this way, the operation could be launched on a massive front and the Turks around the Anzac position could be attacked from the inside and out. A landing south of Anzac would encounter heavy trenches, wire, and machine guns. In contrast, less than five miles north of Anzac there were virtually no defenses (Figure 2).



Military Operations Gallipoli.

Source: Allied Objectives/Turkish Dispositions. Prepared in the General Staff, Military Branch.

The choice of Suvla Bay for a new landing was an excellent one. It offered a safe anchorage for the warships and supply vessels and was known to be lightly defended by the Turks.¹⁰ The Bay is a long curved stretch of sand backed by a flat plain from which rise several low hills. It lies at the end of a chain of mountains that command the center of the Gallipoli peninsula.¹¹ Three steep ridges combine to encircle the Suvla Bay area. On the northern side, from Suvla Point to Ejelmer Bay is the Kiretch Tepe ridge which runs along the northern coast and attains a maximum height of 650 feet. The ridge is rocky and its northern slopes are abrupt. Directly east of the bay, the Tekke Tepe ridge runs south between Ejelmer Bay and the village of Anafarta Sagir and reaches over 900 feet in height. Its sides are steep and scrub bushes covered its sides making any coordinated movement difficult. On the south, the plain is dominated by the Anafarta spur, a long finger-shaped ridge which runs southwest from near Anafarta Sagir. This ridge, about 350 feet high, ends abruptly with a cluster of rugged hills about 300 feet high known as the "W" Hills. A northern offshoot from the "W" Hills is a low, rounded spur whose summit is known as Scimitar Hill. Rising from the plain, midway between the W Hills and Lala Bala, two isolated hills joined by a low neck were termed Chocolate Hill and Green Hill.¹²

An assault against the steep terrain surrounding Suvla Bay would be a formidable task for any force. However, the virtual absence of any major defenses or trenches coupled with the incredibly small Turkish garrison of 1,500 men nullified the terrain's difficulty. Moreover, if the British forces reached their initial objectives on the first or even second day, then the terrain would be ideal for the defense of their supply base in the bay. A small reconnoitering party in late June confirmed the abundance of water and the

absence of Turkish forces in the area. The confirmation that Turkish defenses in the area consisted of only five battalions and small outposts renewed the Allies optimism for the entire Dardanelles operation.¹³

Although the defenses at Suvla Bay were known to be light, the Turkish defenses on other parts of the peninsula were much different. Turkish defenses had changed drastically since the beginning of the campaign and von Sanders now had command of almost sixteen divisions. Four Turkish divisions held the southern Helles front with another division in reserve. Three divisions and a regiment opposed the Allies at Anzac Cove and three divisions guarded the area around Bulair and the Gulf of Saros. Von Sanders still remained concerned about the potential for an invasion of the Asiatic coast and placed his final three divisions there.¹⁴ The weak defenses in Suvla Bay area were a major but acceptable risk for the German commander. His primary source of concern on the peninsula was actually the area between the Anzac position and the Helles front. An Allied landing there could easily cut off their southern front from the rear and sever the lines of communication.¹⁵ Von Sanders' emphasis on the area between Anzac and the southern front meant he could ill afford to defend the Suvla coastline. His defensive strategy against any assault at Suvla Bay would rely on the reserve divisions at Bulair. The admitted weakness in the strategy would be the thirty-six to forty-eight hours it would take for the reserve divisions to travel to the Suvla Bay area.

The limited forces guarding the Suvla Bay area were collectively known as the Anafarta detachment and under the command of a German officer, Major Willmer. The detachment consisted of three battalions, a squadron of cavalry, and two gendarmes

battalions. Major Willmer's specific orders were to "prevent a landing by the enemy, or any extension of his existing front to the north of Ari Burnu." Essentially, Major Willmer had four battalions to defend a coastal area nearly twenty miles wide. His area contained no fixed defenses and stretched five miles south of Suvla Bay and 8 miles north to Ejelmer Bay. Recognizing the difficulty of the situation, Major Willmer constructed strong points from which he hoped to delay any attacks until the reserve divisions around Bulair were activated. He placed a forward position on Kiretch Tepe, one on Hill 10, and one each on Chocolate Hill and on Green Hill. His main position was a string of strong points from Baka Baba to the W Hills. Kiretch Tepe was held by two companies, Hill 10 by three Companies, and Chocolate Hill by three companies. A small line of sentries dotted the coast and his artillery consisted of eight mountain guns.¹⁶ Virtually no wire or machine guns were available and only small trenches employed by the entire detachment. Major Willmer's position was extremely vulnerable and he was deservedly doubtful of his forces' ability to resist a concerted attack by the Allies (Figure 3).

To the Germans and Turks another attack was highly probable and imminent. In July, Churchill preempted the new offensive with a public speech that touted that the final success of the army in the Dardanelles was near. Von Sanders also received intelligence reports from German General Headquarters that an attack would be made in the beginning of August. Reports of heavy concentrations of men on the island of Lemnos and the presence of new British transport vessels added to the rumors of a new offensive by the Allies.¹⁷ While unable to determine the location of the impending attack, the intelligence




Figure 3. Suvla Bay and Turkish Dispositions 6 August. Source: *Military Operations Gallipoli*.

von Sanders received was exceptionally accurate. His 1,500 Turkish defenders at Suvla Bay would soon face off against an Allied invasion force of over 20,000 men.

Hamilton would eventually receive five divisions for the campaign and used four divisions for operations in Suvla Bay. The other units would reinforce the Helles front and assist with the simultaneous breakout from the Anzac beachhead. The two primary divisions making the initial assault were the 10th and 11th "New Army" divisions and consisted of British Empire volunteers. The training and initiative of these New Army divisions was questionable. The New Army divisions were in all respects a conscript army and out of sync with the professional British Army traditions. The divisions were led by older regular officers but devoid of a trained and experienced NCO corps. The troops were admittedly ill-trained for the type of combat they were about to enter. These units had principally been trained for static trench combat in France and not the maneuver warfare that would be required at Suvla Bay.¹⁸ Also, these units would have been eased into combat on the western front instead of thrown directly into it at Suvla Bay. Nonetheless, the British possessed a tremendous advantage over the Turks in manpower, equipment, and surprise.

In general terms the purpose of the Suvla Bay operation was to first place a covering force ashore at night with such surprise and speed that it would overwhelm the Turkish garrison before dawn and then rapidly seize the heights encircling the Bay. The original plan placed great emphasis on the importance of capturing the Chocolate Hills and W Hills before daybreak of the first night. After daybreak, the covering troops would be heavily reinforced in order to assist the Australian and New Zealand force if needed to

capture Hill 305. The plan called for landing three infantry brigades of the 11th Division almost as simultaneously as possible at 2200 on 6 August and then complete the landing at least an hour before dawn. In all, 13,700 men and twelve guns were to be landed before dawn. At daylight the troops would be followed by 7,000 more infantry and then a continuous flow of horses, mules, ammunition, and supplies (See Appendix C and D).¹⁹

The night assault would be carried out in three echelons at three different beaches. "A" beach which originally was contiguous with the other beaches was changed by the IX Corps staff to be inside the Bay. "B" and "C" were short adjoining beaches just slightly south of Nibrunesi Point. The first echelon would consist of three infantry brigades, some supporting companies, the 11th divisional headquarters, and totaled over 10,300 men. Ten destroyers would transport the first echelon to their beaches with motor lighters placing them ashore. If all went well, it was hoped the first three brigades would be ashore in the first hour. The second echelon was planned to arrive off "B" and "C" beaches an hour after the first echelon and would consist of 3,000 infantry troops, the divisional signal company and some artillery batteries. The third echelon would bring the majority of gun horses and wagons, signal wagons and water carts. As soon as the troops from the night landings were ashore, the remaining battalions of the 10th Division would come ashore at day break.²⁰

The key to the plan's success was surprise and speed. To ensure surprise, Hamilton required the utmost secrecy of the plans and as such, many who should have been intimately familiar with the plan were not. Consequently, the Corps commander was only briefed on the plan just fifteen days prior to the actual campaign (Figure 4). At first

ALLIED MEDITERRANEAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
CHAIN OF COMMAND
(Period of 6-15 August 1915)





Figure 4. Allied Chain of Command.

Stopford acknowledged his overwhelming support of the plan, but four days later was concerned about attacking “an organized system of trenches without the assistance of a large number of howitzers.” The fact that an organized system of trenches did not exist was lost on him and the officers of the GHQ were unable to convince him otherwise. Because of Stopford’s objections, the final orders for the operation were modified such that the IX Corps was not tied to capturing any specific point or objective (i.e., The Chocolate Hills and W Hills) by dawn of the first day.²¹ This change to placate Stopford effectively removed the essential element of rapid movement and now implied that his primary object would be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for the northern zone.

Stopford issued his orders and assigned the main task of securing the beachhead to the 11th Division. General Hammersley, commander of the 11th Division, issued his orders on 5 August. His specific task was to secure the three beaches and Suvla Bay for the landing of the 10th Division. The 34th Brigade under Brigadier General Sitwell would be the lead brigade and land at “A” beach, capture Hill 10, and move two battalions along the northern part of the bay and then up the Kiretch Tepe ridge. After capture of Hill 10, the remainder of the brigade was to move forward and capture the Chocolate Hills. The 32d Brigade under Brigadier-General Haggard would land simultaneously at “B” beach and capture Lala Baba and then proceed forward to Hill 10 and join the 34th Brigade’s attack on the Chocolate Hills. The 33rd Brigade under Brigadier General Maxwell was to protect the right flank of the landing by digging a line from the Bay to the corner of the Salt Lake (Figure 5).²²

IX CORPS
CHAIN OF COMMAND
(As of 6 August 1915)



13th Western Division attached to ANZAC (Not represented)

*Principal Landing Units only

Stopford relieved 16 August
Mahon resigns 16 August
Lindley resigns 17 August
Sitwell relieved 17 August
Hammersley relieved 23 August

Figure 5. British IX Corps Chain of Command.

The landings began just after 2130 on 6 August. The prevailing conditions at the beach were ideal. The beach was undefended and the men began moving from their lighters inland. The first battalions of the 11th Division landed and began their assigned work on entrenchments to guard the right flank. The companies that followed began an assault on Lala Baba just inside the Bay. The assault on Lala Baba by two companies of the 6th Yorkshire is of significance because it was the first attack by any unit of the “New Army” in the Great War. The eager but inexperienced troops had initially been told that only bayonets should be used until daybreak but when they assaulted the point, they came under an intense fire. The battalions actually captured the hill but in doing so had lost a disproportionate number of officers in the process. Their next objective was to move forward and attack Hill 10; however, all the officers except two junior subalterns had fallen and other more senior officers had not yet landed. The two surviving officers had no idea what to do next and simply laid their troops down and waited to be told what to do next.²³

Owing to the secrecy placed on the mission orders, it was not until the afternoon of 6 August that most units were told of their immediate departure for the peninsula. Brigade orders were issued about midday and most subordinate leaders were unaware of their specific tasks until already loaded on to the crowded lighters. This oversight contributed significantly to confusion on the beaches during the initial hours of the landings. Further, when combined with the delayed dissemination of the orders, the subsequent loss of senior officers meant that command would soon fall on junior officers who would end up leading attacks without actually knowing what the objectives were.²⁴

Apart from the losses of the 6th Yorkshire, most had gone well with the landing at B beach. The next part of the plan was that both Yorkshire battalions were to proceed on and join if necessary, the 34th Brigade's assault on Hill 10. However, the 34th Brigade was not in place and well behind schedule. Instead of seizing the initiative and pressing forward to capture the lightly defended Hill 10, the colonel in charge of the two leading battalions decided not to advance for fear of mistakenly engaging fellow British troops in the darkness.²⁵ He waited with his battalions for further guidance on what to do, losing precious hours in the process, even though his forces were significantly larger than the meager Turkish forces guarding the hill.

The 34th Brigade's landing at "A" beach inside the Bay met with incredible problems and foreshadowed the entire disaster. Besides the fact that the lighters had grounded on a reef and the men had to crawl through deep water to get ashore, the troops had almost landed in the wrong spot which greatly increased the amount of confusion on the beaches. Although the 34th Brigade was having trouble getting ashore, there was certainly enough combat power for the battalions already on shore to press on toward Hill 10. No one in authority would make the decisions that needed to be made and the local commanders decided in any event to stick with the plan and wait for the entire brigade to finish landing. This meant critical delays, loss of surprise, and another lost opportunity. The 34th Brigade continued to encounter problems, and when they finally did complete their landing, a brigade officer unwittingly directed an attack against the wrong hill.

Confusion and wasted opportunities characterized the next five hours of the operation. Officer loss had a tremendous impact and contributed significantly to the

failure of the initial assault. The 11th Division had worn white arm bands to identify themselves and made great targets for the experienced Turkish snipers. Officers wearing them were extremely vulnerable. The officers of the lead battalions of all brigades were decimated and this further fueled disorder on the beaches. The loss of these officers also ensured the loss of any forward impetus to attack and meant loss of knowledge of objectives and tasks that subsequently meant the lower leaders were to simply wait to be told what to do next. In sum, throughout the first eight hours, only three battalions had been seriously engaged, seven other battalions had not yet seen action. At daybreak on the morning of the 7 August, instead of being established in the surrounding hills, the 11th Division had merely captured the horns of the Bay.

Even after eight hours little of this was known at 11th Division headquarters, which was established on the beach less than two miles from the action, and absolutely none of it was known by the corps commander.²⁶ Until this time, the IX Corps commander, far removed from the general situation, remained completely ignorant of any action on the beach. An overall view of the situation and a commanding leadership presence was desperately needed on the beach and could have easily alleviated the disarray. Stopford, however, remained on the sloop *Jonquil* to enable better communication with the different parts of the landings and provide coordination for the entire operation. In placing himself on the sloop he inadvertently split his staff into several different parts. The *Jonquil* was a small sloop and his corps staff could not fit on it. The corps staff was split up among several ships and this actually increased the time required for communication and coordination and thereby contributed to the delay on the beach.

Despite the critical aspect of the initial landings, Stopford remained convinced he should not interfere with the conduct of the division commanders. In a further lapse, he made no effort to keep Hamilton or the GHQ Staff informed of the situation. Stopford's only action on the *Jonquil* was to acknowledge what little information he had received from the division commanders. His one definitive action would actually add more confusion to the operation.²⁷

At daybreak on the 7 August, Stopford diverted the 10th Division troops from landing on "A" beach and sent them to "C" beach in order to avoid the same trouble the 34th Brigade experienced. These six battalions' initial purpose was to take the Kiretch Tepe ridge, but Stopford, in redirecting them south, placed them over three miles away from their objective. He gave temporary command of them to the 11th Division and deemed they were to revert to the 10th Division once its commander arrived. Due to the lack of overall leadership and the general confusion on the beachhead, this transfer would actually not occur for almost five days. When the battalions actually did land and were placed under Hammersley's orders, their orders and objective were continually changed. While they were originally supposed to march north to Mahon's control and participate in taking the Kiretch Tepe ridge, Hammersley directed that they not join the 10th and that they should participate in the action to take the Chocolate Hills. Thus from the outset the entire organization of the 10th Division was completely disrupted and Mahon had barely three battalions under his control.²⁸

As for the 11th Division, the 32d and the 34th Brigades were intermixed, and although it would have been easy to sort them out, nothing was done to do it. Brigadier

General Haggard commanded the 32d Brigade but he and his brigade were put under the orders of Brigadier General Sitwell and the 34th Brigade supposedly for the purpose of ensuring coordinated attacks. Barely one-half mile from the shore, Sitwell fell completely out of touch with the situation and deemed it imperative that the brigades adopt a defensive attitude. Meanwhile, Hammersley exercised no contact with any of his brigades for nearly five hours, even though they remained within two miles of his position. During this time, he issued three orders, each one canceling its predecessor. The first definitive order he issued was for Sitwell to wait for the arrival of the 31st Brigade from the 10th Division and then commence his attack on the Chocolate Hills. The 34th Brigade, therefore, could not start until the arrival of the 31st Brigade and this would cause another serious delay in the operation.

At the 11th Division Headquarters, Major General Hammersley was shaken to a near state of emotional collapse after a shell had burst nearby. Subsequently, under extreme stress he issued yet another order that canceled the previous one. The order was so ambiguous that the brigade commanders did not know what to do. After the 31st Brigade had finally landed, the verbal instructions given to General Hill did not agree with the latest message given to Sitwell. The original objective and the obvious mission was to capture the Chocolate Hills, however, Sitwell waited for more clarification and direct guidance and decided his best course of action was to do simply nothing.²⁹

A staff officer from the division was sent to determine the reason for Sitwell's inaction. The officer immediately recognized that a sad situation had developed as Sitwell's mass of men were standing around, disorganized and almost completely

demoralized. Brigadier General Hill, in command of the 10th Division's 31st Brigade, complied with Hammersley's orders and pressed forward to attack the Chocolate Hills. However, by the time the divisional staff officer explained Sitwell's situation to the Division HQ, Hammersley made new orders once again and canceled the 31st Brigade's forward movement. New orders were issued for a renewed attack with coordination by all three brigades. The commander of the attack was chosen to be Sitwell and was based on his seniority among the other brigadiers; despite the staff officer's description of Sitwell's reluctance to adopt any type of offensive posture. Chocolate Hill was finally attacked, but not one of the three brigadiers accompanied their troops to the attack. The hill was taken but the confusion and lack of central coordination resulted nearly in 700 casualties against less than 500 Turkish defenders.³⁰

On the northern side of Suvla Bay conditions of the 10th Division were not much better. Lieutenant General Mahon's troops were under another serious delay. The actual disembarkation of his troops was not completed until late in the afternoon. The troops under Brigadier General Nicol, commander of the 30th Brigade, were to move along Kiretch Tepe in support of a battalion that was already there. This was the extent of their orders, and since no other specific objective had been allotted, they made no attempt to push on. On one of the most strategic positions of the entire bay, barely 300 Turks opposed an entire brigade, while its brigadier waited for further orders.

The only progress made in the first twenty-four hours at Suvla was the taking of the horns of the Bay. Despite weak positions and inadequate forces the Turks retained all the hills encircling bay and British lack of coordination and reluctance was to blame. At

this point, less than half of the corps' battalions had been engaged. Remarkably, in landing on the lightly defended bay, the corps had already lost 100 officers and 1,600 men, a figure equivalent to the entire Turkish force in the area. The losses included a high proportion of battalion commanders and other senior officers and showed the remarkable skill of the Turkish marksmen. However, the large number of British casualties was due in fact more to the British inactivity than to any stout resistance by the Turks.³¹

Throughout 7 August, the GHQ and Hamilton exercised no influence on the Suvla Bay operations. Absence of news from the landing gradually broke the optimism that had flourished among the GHQ Staff. The Staff then began a frustrating effort to determine the state of affairs of the landing. General Stopford cabled at 0730 on the morning of 7 August that Hill 10 had not yet been taken, and that the troops had barely advanced beyond the edge of the beach. At this early stage, but with the operation already incredibly behind schedule, had General Hamilton gone personally to see what was happening and insisted on an immediate advance, the course of the entire campaign may have changed. It was not to be, and it was not until late in the afternoon that Hamilton was even aroused to send a message to Stopford requesting more frequent updates on the operation.³²

In contrast to Stopford's and Hamilton's lethargy, von Sanders was busily moving forces to counter the invasion. Von Sanders was at first apprehensive about moving his reserves until he developed a fuller understanding of the situation. He maintained constant contact with Major Willmer throughout the evening of 6 August. By early the next morning, von Sanders determined that a main offensive was occurring at Suvla Bay with

Hill 305 and Chunuk Bair as the objectives and ordered his reserves into action. He quickly ordered two divisions from Bulair to march south and moved one division from the Helles front north to support the operation.³³

Initially believing the British would try to push southeast, Willmer concentrated his forces on the W Hills. At 1900 on 7 August, Willmer provided an excellent report of the situation estimating that at least one and half divisions had landed. He further stated “will hold the W Hills position under all circumstances.” By the end of the day, Willmer’s main line was roughly 3,000 yards wide from Baka Baba to the W Hills. He had roughly 1,100 men and five mountain guns defending against the British forces less than two miles away. With no reinforcements and the Turkish reserves still twelve to twenty-four hours away, Willmer remained in a precarious situation. More and more British troops were arriving and it was apparent that this operation was a major thrust at Suvla Bay. Although twenty-four hours had lapsed after the first landings and none of the hills had been gained, the Allied door for victory was still wide open at the dawn of 8 August (Figure 6).³⁴

Von Sanders continued his resolute leadership of the Turkish forces by rapidly analyzing the situation and proposing counterattacks against the British forces. When one of his subordinate commander’s chief of staff personally urged retreat to avoid losing their lines of communication, von Sanders replied that “not one foot of ground should be surrendered” and promptly ordered the firing of that chief of staff. Additionally, he ordered Feizi Bey, commander of the reserve divisions at Bulair, to counter attack no later than 8 August. Feizi Bey, rightfully convinced by his division commanders that his troops were tired, hungry, and in no position to conduct a counterattack, decided to postpone the




Figure 6. Positions of Allied and Turkish Forces 1:00 AM, 8 August. Source: *Military Operations Gallipoli*.

attack until the next day. When von Sanders learned of the postponement, he promptly relieved Feizi Bey and replaced him with the aggressive commander of the 19th Division, Mustafa Kemal.³⁵

The British Official History cites the lack of leadership jeopardizing the plan on the 7 August and completely ruining it on 8 August. The morning of 8 August was marked with a quietness unknown to a major operation. The shores were lined with bathers and neither Stopford nor his chief of staff had yet been ashore. Hammersley recognized the importance of moving forward but found both his key brigadiers opposed; they needed more time for rest and reorganization. The Turks, on the other hand, were rapidly moving south to set up their defenses. Since Hammersley received no guidance to move forward from Stopford, his will to press forward dissolved and he readily accepted the notion that the troops needed rest and reorganization before moving forward. Stopford agreed and responded with a congratulations to his division commanders for their fine efforts in capturing the beach.³⁶

At 1050 Stopford cabled Hamilton that he was consolidating his position on the beach. Finally alarmed, Hamilton sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Aspinall forward to determine the situation. Despite the fact that GHQ informed Stopford that aerial reconnaissance indicated there were no substantial trenches and very few defenders in the area, Stopford still did not move. Stopford did decide at 1100 to tell his divisions to press forward, however, only if the area was lightly defended, as he did not want his divisions attacking entrenched positions. Out of touch with the situation on the beaches and lacking any adequate reconnaissance, Stopford remained convinced that his delay was due to the

Turkish entrenchments, even though his key division knew no trenches existed. He sent a message to Hamilton stating that it would be inadvisable to continue forward without adequate artillery support. This ultimately convinced Hamilton that he needed to intervene. Hammersley meanwhile had received an erroneous report of heavy fire and in compliance with the earlier orders of Stopford did not order any of his battalions forward against the hills. Throughout the day with twenty-two battalions on shore, and opposed by less than 1,500 Turks, an entire corps remained within two miles of the beach and did not advance at all.³⁷

Hamilton prepared to leave his ship at 1100 on 8 August but his destroyer was having maintenance problems, and despite the hundreds of vessels in the area, none was readily available for his use. It would not be until 1800 before he would actually reach the bay. Hamilton briefly discussed the situation with Stopford who referred Hamilton to his division commanders ashore. He immediately went to discuss the situation with Hammersley who argued that he could not move during the night and would need at least until 0800 the next day to accomplish an attack. Finally, Hamilton convinced Hammersley that with sixteen battalions under his control, he could launch an offensive. Hammersley ordered the 32d Brigade to mount an attack against the Tekke Tepe Ridge. Unfortunately, the brigade commander was unaware of the position of his troops and his desire to "round up" his forces caused a considerable delay. Had the brigadier known where his battalions were, he had two battalions already at the foot of the Tekke Tepe ridge, they could have taken the ridge with little effort (Figure 7). Instead he waited until all his troops were on hand and commenced his attack just before dawn, nearly twelve




Figure 7. Arrival of Turkish Reinforcements. Source: *Military Operations Gallipoli*.

hours after Hamilton had called for an immediate attack. By this time it was too late and the Turkish reinforcements were just reaching the top of the ridge. The brigade commander's ignorance of the position of his battalions and his unfortunate order to concentrate them together was fatal. The attack finally commenced in the morning, unfortunately, by now there existed an almost equal ratio of Turks to the attacking brigade. The attack failed completely and the British sustained high casualties. Other attacks on the 9 August were also futile as the Turks began to methodically take the unguarded high ground and were now in almost equal numbers to the British units conducting the attacks.³⁸

The situation on the evening of 9 August saw the advantages of surprise completely erased. Divisions and brigades were completely disorganized and their units so widely scattered and intermixed that the chain of command had completely disappeared. The general situation was chaotic and rations and supplies were even difficult to obtain. The basic tactical unit, the battalion, was tired, disorganized, dispirited, and had lost a large number of officers. That same evening, the 53rd Division would land on the secure beachhead and in a matter of hours become just as scattered and disorganized.³⁹

A GHQ message late that evening urged Stopford to continue an attack against the Anafarta Spur. General Stopford finally issued orders for an attack on 10 August. Unfortunately, the attacking unit's key officers were among the first casualties and the attack completely failed. Hamilton ordered another attack by the 54th Division on the 11th but the indecision of its officers and their inability to fully organize a coordinated operation effectively doomed the attack.

After five more days of uncoordinated and seemingly amateur attacks, Hamilton finally replaced Stopford on 16 August. But by now, all surprise was lost and the corps in the Suvla Bay area was utterly disorganized and demoralized. Within five days of the original landings, Lieutenant General Mahon would resign his command, Sitwell and Hammersley would be replaced, and Major General Lindley of the 53rd Division would voluntarily resign. New and younger generals were on their way from the Western Front, but these changes were too late. By 16 August, the battle was already lost and the British had no chance of taking the once unoccupied high ground now filled with well entrenched Turks.⁴⁰

Both British and Turkish reports after the war cite the failure of the IX Corps as the defining moment of the Dardanelles campaign. The key factors that contributed to the defeat of the corps can be directly traced to failures in leadership, communication, and planning. Although the plan developed by Hamilton's staff was intricate and complex, the failure resulted more from the inability of commanders at all levels to exercise flexibility and initiative when things were not going well according to the plan. The reluctance of these officers at the division and brigade level doomed the entire operation. At every turn, opportunities were presented for brigade and division commanders to rise to the occasion and seize the initiative, but they failed to do so in every case. Junior leaders at the battalion and company level likewise failed to exercise initiative, and their resulting inactivity made them and their troops excellent targets for the seasoned Turkish marksmen.

The failure of the IX Corps signaled the end of the entire Dardanelles operation. Shortly after the failure of the corps to move inland, Hamilton estimated he would need another 95,000 troops to obtain his initial objectives. This figure was far in excess of what the Dardanelles Committee was likely to provide and the failure of the IX Corps further convinced the committee of the futility of the campaign. Kitchener then subsequently issued his recall of Hamilton. At the beginning of the campaign of the British “Great Adventure,” the British soldier was considered far superior to the backward and uneducated Turk. When all was said and done, it was the Turkish soldier that fought with equal valor, was better organized, and in the end more brilliantly led.

¹ Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 139.

² Geoffrey Regan, *Great Military Disasters* (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc. 1987), 232. The *Turkish Official History* acknowledges the importance of the Suvla Bay Landings. The decision to land at Suvla, “might have brought results of vast importance, had they been energetically carried out...and where operations could [then] have been conducted in open country, they could have reached Boghali by way of Grand Anafarta. This objective once attained, would have made the invaders masters of the straits,” 40.

³ Trevor Royle, *The Kitchener Enigma* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd. 1985), 324. The Allied expedition had suffered 8,700 casualties in its first five days and by the end of the first battle of Krithia had endured another 6,500. Statistic’s of the Great War, 284. See also Hamilton’s *Gallipoli Diary Vol I*, 205 for the complete cable and Lord Kitchener’s cable on 231.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 326.

⁵ Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton *Gallipoli Diary Vol II* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920), 214-220.

⁶ Regan, *Great Military Disasters*, 233. See also Hamilton’s *Gallipoli Diary*, 283-284, and Steel, Nigel and Hart, Peter. *Defeat at Gallipoli*. (London: Macmillan, 1994), 219-220.

⁷ C.E.W. Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War Vols I and II* (Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1921), 436-438.

⁸ Brigadier-General C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1929), 67-71.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 127-128.

¹⁰ Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War*, 140. Hamilton and his staff worked closely with Admiral de Robeck on the selection of Suvla Bay for the landings. The one negative aspect of Suvla Bay was that it was not effectively charted and the naval staff feared uncharted rocks and shallows. They recommended the troops be put ashore a mile south of the bay and their recommendations were accepted. Steel and Hart, *Defeat at Gallipoli*, 219.

¹¹ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II*, 129-130.

¹² *Ibid.*, 130.

¹³ Bean, *The Official History of Australia in the War Vol II*, 434.

¹⁴ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II*, 162-165. See also Von Sanders, Liman. *Five Years in Turkey*, 78-80. and Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, 200-202.

¹⁵ Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey* (Annapolis: The United States Naval Institute, 19270, (Reprinted from August Scherl Edition, Berlin 1920), 80. The *Turkish Official History* is critical of von Sanders for his preoccupation with the Helles Front and his lack of concern for the Anafarta (Suvla) area. See page 47.

¹⁶ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II*, 165.

¹⁷ Von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, 80-82. The British build-up of forces on the island of Lemnos is also cited in the *Turkish Official History*, 47. Von Sanders and Kannengiesser both attest to their suspicion of new Allied assaults, especially after a public speech in June 1915 by Winston Churchill wherein he alluded that the final success of the Allied army was near. See Higgins, *Winston Churchill and the Dardanelles*, 208.

¹⁸ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II*, 298.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 223.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 224-225.

²¹ Ibid., 229-231. Also see Appendix C and D for actual changes in plan. The changes to the plan were spearheaded by Stopford's Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Reed, who undoubtedly influenced Stopford and exercised a much greater concern over entrenchments than was necessary.

²² Ibid., 225-228.

²³ Ibid., 237.

²⁴ Cohen and Gooch, *Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War*, 155.

²⁵ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II*, 235-238.

²⁶ Ibid., 240-244.

²⁷ Ibid., 248-250.

²⁸ Ibid., 245-250.

²⁹ Ibid., 251-254.

³⁰ Ibid., 259.

³¹ Ibid., 261.

³² Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary Vol II*, 56. Characteristic of Hamilton's optimistic demeanor and desire not to interfere is the cable he ordered sent to Stopford on the afternoon of 7 August. "Have only received one cable from you. Chief glad to hear enemy position weakening and knows you will take advantage to push on rapidly. Prisoners state landing is a surprise so take every advantage before you are forestalled."

³³ Von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, 83-85.

³⁴ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 267. See also Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, 217-218.

³⁵ Ibid., 283-284. See also Von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey*, 85. and Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*, 219. Although Mustafa Kemal eagerly accepted his new command and responsibility, he actually had no problems with the orders already given and the best he could do was to see that they were not furthered postponed.

³⁶ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli Vol II*, 270. In addition to the congratulations he sent to both the 10th and 11th divisions, Stopford demonstrated his

lack of knowledge of the situation and fueled Hamilton's optimism with the following cable: "I consider that Hammersley and the troops under his command deserve great credit for the results obtained against *strenuous opposition* and great difficulty...."

³⁷ Ibid., 261.

³⁸ Ibid., 282, 288. As the British Official History notes, despite the unpardonable delay of two days, the race for the Teke Tepe was lost by less than 30 minutes!

³⁹ Ibid., 297. Despite landing unopposed on the secure beachhead on the evening of the 9th, the 53rd Division instantly became disorganized and ineffective. It's division staff lost track of two of its battalions. Supplies, rations, and equipment were not distributed and the officers that led the divisions first action on the 10th were without maps.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 326-327.

CHAPTER 3

COMMAND CULTURE

I should not like it, If I were a Divisional Commander, to have my orders interfered with by my corps commander.

Sir Frederick Stopford, *The Dardanelles Commission*

The failure of the IX Corps in the Suvla Bay landings remains one of the most remarkable failures in the history of the British army. How could a force of the size, magnitude, and resources of the IX Corps be defeated by a force of less than 1,500 men? To the casual observer the failure is directly attributable to the breakdown in leadership at the corps, division, and brigade levels. The lack of initiative and aggressive offense absent from the leaders of the Suvla Bay landings, coupled with the restrictive tactical control, contributed immeasurably to the inertia of the IX Corps on the 7th and 8th of August. Other problems were manifested in the complete lack of effective communication between the brigades, divisions, and corps and the stifling secrecy placed on the plans. However, a critical issue in the analysis of World War I failures has been raised by author Tim Travers. In his book *The Killing Ground*, he concludes that when analyzing the failures of World War I, it should generally be the system rather than the individual that should be examined.¹ This analysis of the Suvla Bay failure follows Travers' general premise and analyzes the extent that the British system is at fault. The occurrence of these factors can be traced to system failures and the influence of British army culture.

Three distinct but common attributes of the British command culture played critical roles in the British failure at Suvla Bay. These areas are: the seniority and rank system prevalent in the British army which required the appointment of a corps commander with very little command experience and no combat experience. The institutional and inherent command method of umpiring among senior leaders which precluded Hamilton and Stopford from interfering with their subordinates. And last, the centralized command system of restrictive control of tactical units which discouraged company and battalion officers from exercising initiative. These attributes of the culture bear large responsibility for the failure of the IX Corps to move forward, its lack of effective and expedient communication, the undue secrecy of the plan, and the divergent views on the overall intent of the operation. These attributes were not unique to the Dardanelles campaign but common among British army units and responsible for failures along the western front as well. In brief, the prevalent culture of the British army left it unprepared for the continental war and just as unprepared for the demanding conditions of the Mediterranean Theater.

The essential character of the British command culture of World War I evolved from the traditions of the Victorian Army in the latter half of the 1800s. The British Army at the beginning of the Great War was in most respects a colonial army designed to police and guard the Empire's possessions. In fact, the ancient method of purchasing commissions up to the rank of colonel had persisted in the British army until 1871, long after the practice had been abandoned by the continental armies.² After 1871, few reforms changed the design of the British Army or prompted serious study of the art of war.

Limited reforms were implemented in the early 1900s after the initial embarrassment of the Boer War, but even still, the general lessons of the Boer War were largely forgotten by the beginning of the Great War. The army prior to the war was still a regimental army and based on the strict traditions associated with an almost independent regimental system. The regimental system was well-suited to the demands of imperial defense, but by its design difficult to operationally control. Although the British Army may have been backward when compared to the armies of Europe, it was perfectly satisfactory for the purpose for which it existed, which was to provide as cheaply as possible an imperial gendarmerie capable of fighting colonial wars.³

The British army between 1900 and 1914 remained in a transitional phase but never completely evolved from the Victorian Army of the 1800s.⁴ The transition from a small traditional army to a professional continental type was extremely difficult. The meager attempts at reforms usually failed as traditional attitudes of the British officer corps resisted change. New concepts, tactics, and procedures learned from other institutions and other armies were ultimately changed to fit into acceptable channels or molded to fit the prevailing attitudes of the time. The problem of the army before the war can be best summed up as a difficult transition from a traditionally gentlemanly ideal to a functionally competent and professional ideal.⁵

The peacetime army prior to World War I consisted of only six divisional headquarters and one corps headquarters. Few senior officers attained the opportunity to command above the regiment and command experience was largely gained from their regimental experiences. Prior to the war, “most officers aspired to be, and the successful

career was measured on an individual becoming a colonel and commanding the regiment from which he initially served in.”⁶ Thus, the limited opportunity for command of prewar units larger than a regiment contributed immensely to the assertion that senior officers were inadequately trained to exercise control over the large organizations of the World War.

In late 1914, the British Army of the war doubled in size in a span of two months. By the end of the war, the British Army completed a seven fold increase in its number of men. The rapid expansion of men and units meant experienced officers and senior leaders were in very short supply. Senior officers who had never commanded more than 1,000 men together were now in the position to command tens of thousands. Hundreds of officers were “dug out” of retirement to train and command new units. To deal with this phenomena, the British Army placed its emphasis and confidence on leadership. Personal leadership of men was a concept which the British Army was confident it understood and mastered. Command of organizations was more problematic, and few senior officers had ever contemplated the need of a command structure for an army larger than six infantry divisions.⁷ The obvious result was a senior officer corps ill-prepared for the duties they were to assume and reluctant to abandon its prewar concepts and emphasis on personal leadership.

In Edwardian times, officers prepared for the challenges of command through service on the British General Staff and or through attendance at the General Staff College. The Imperial General Staff was established only a decade before the war, in 1904, and was brought about by the limited reforms associated with the Boer War. The

General Staff was divided into two parts, the War Office Staff and the Staff of the regional commands. The Chief of the General Staff was limited in powers and in many respects relegated to entirely administrative affairs. The Chief of the British General Staff served primarily as advisor to the Secretary of State for War and had no direct command authority. The powers of the 144 staff officers in the regional commands was equally limited and never obtained the status of his equivalent in the German Staff system. Furthermore, the British General Staff was fundamentally different from the German General Staff in all regards to selection of officers, promotion opportunities, conduct, and prestige. Service on the British staff was no guarantee of accelerated promotion or advancement, and in contrast to the German General Staff, the British Staff Officer could merely count on being another of the commander's subordinate staff officers.⁸

In general, neither British staff officers nor the British Staff College was held in great esteem. Many regarded the staff college as a waste of time and some regiments would not send their officers there. Selection for the Staff College was based on a quota system where each arm was given a fixed number of candidates. The quota system ensured that a proper percentage and mix of officers attended the college, however, it did not ensure a proper mix of quality officers attended. Incredibly, to guarantee the proper mix of officers, many officers were selected for attendance and had actually not passed the entrance exam.⁹ A nomination system introduced in the 1880s was used to send officers who had "command potential" but had scored poorly on the examination. The nomination procedure was a subjective element and based primarily on connections and the patronage system. In addition, the training at the Staff College included little training in staff duties

or in tactics, but consisted mostly of field engineering. Graduation was a near guarantee regardless of score on the final examination.¹⁰ In sum, the primary tool used to train and prepare officers for senior leadership was itself a product of the Army's culture and traditions. The college and the staff too overtly represented the gentlemanly attitudes and customs of the Victorian Army, an army concerned more about status, prestige and privilege than serious study of the art of war.

In *The Killing Ground*, Tim Travers makes the assertion that the British Army was not a professional army in the same category as the German army of the day, but an army that was still feudal in status and very personal in nature. The attitudes of the British officer corps was still largely Victorian and placed emphasis on the influence of individual personalities and on social and regimental hierarchies and traditions. This encouraged the existence of an unofficial personalized system at the higher levels of command. This personalized system emphasized on warfighting with and replaced it with an emphasis on rank, position, personal desires, and sensitivities. The existence of this personalized system fostered weakness in training and the quality of officers. Gentlemanly traits became more valued than warfighting skills, and the discussion of tactics and maneuvers was not pursued. Consequently, an acknowledged system of distortions and cover-ups existed to protect officers' reputations, and an emphasis on position, social status, and promotion took front seat to the serious business of warfighting.¹¹

A critical element of the personalized nature of the army was its advancement and promotion system. British promotion at the beginning of the war was no different than it had been in Victorian times and was based on the principles of patronage and seniority.

Patronage played a key role in the peacetime armies in Edwardian and Victorian times, especially at the higher levels where friendships of senior officers or royalty could significantly influence promotion. Seniority was also a common element of the British Army culture and played the dominant role in the appointment of most officers in the British Army. While seniority systems existed in most armies, the strict adherence to the dogma of rank and seniority exceeded the natural check and balance systems of other armies. The British promotion system thrived on a system that ultimately rewarded those that have served the longest and not necessarily those that have served the best.¹²

Seniority as a system also ignores the health and physical fitness ability of the individual. In his treatise on the diseases of generalship completed a few years after the war, J.F.C. Fuller cited physical fitness as one of his three pillars of Generalship. “War is obviously a young man’s occupation. The older a man grows, the more cautious he becomes; age may endow a man with experience, but in peace time there can be no moral experience of war, and little physical experience. Physically, an old man is unable to share with his men the rough and tumble of war.”¹³ Soon after the initial Gallipoli landings in April 1915, the harsh conditions of the campaign were recognized. The occurrence of fatigue and stress not only on the soldiers in the trenches but on senior leaders was instantly apparent. Any new general officers selected to participate in the Gallipoli campaign would definitely have to bear the harsh conditions of the Mediterranean environment.

Hamilton himself was acutely aware of the harsh climate of the Mediterranean and listed qualifications for his new corps commander as having “a good stiff constitution and

nerve.” When Hamilton received news on 15 June of the new divisions his command would be receiving, he immediately began considerations for a corps commander. He was first asked by Kitchener of his opinion of Lieutenant General Mahon, who Hamilton felt was “not up to running a corps out here.” From his cable of 15 June, Hamilton requested either Julian Byng or Henry Rawlinson and felt they both possessed the right qualities.¹⁴ General French who commanded these generals on the western front was adverse to the loss of any of his officers to the Dardanelles’ “side show” and would not allow their departure. Also, Kitchener insisted that Lt. General Mahon be in the theater because Mahon had trained the 10th Division and Kitchener felt it imperative that he accompany them. Barely twelve other officers of Lieutenant General rank were Mahon’s senior and most were already in commands or unfit for the harsh conditions of the Mediterranean. Hamilton was left with the choice of two Lt. Generals, Ian Ewart or Sir Frederick Stopford. Hamilton’s disgust with these two candidates to command his new corps is represented in a cable sent to Sir John French on 17 June, stating “I have fine corps commanders in Birdwood, Hunter-Weston, and Gouraud. This is very fortunate. Who is to be the new corps commander I cannot say, but we have one or two terrifying suggestions from home.”¹⁵ Although obviously distressed at the candidates, Hamilton still failed to fight for better candidates. He surely must have known that the success of the campaign would be greatly influenced by its leader. Part of the answer may lie in Hamilton’s subordinate relationship with Lord Kitchener. Hamilton, in fact, had acquiesced to Kitchener earlier in 1915 when his original chief of staff was replaced by General Braithwaite.

Hamilton felt that Stopford was the better choice of the two candidates primarily because Stopford seemed physically healthier than Ewart and possessed a “calm” that Ewart did not. While perhaps possessing the “calm” described by Hamilton, Sir Frederick Stopford still gave the impression of a unhealthy man unfit for the rigors of the Dardanelles. At 61, Stopford was at the average age for most senior officers; however, he had been “dug-out” from retirement to assist the rapidly expanding army of Britain. Stopford had, in fact, retired over five years earlier in 1909 for reasons of “ill-health.” The novelist and staff officer Compton Mackenzie would later comment on Stopford’s appearance, “he was deprecating, courteous, fatherly, anything except the commander of an Army Corps which had been entrusted with a major operation that might change the whole course of the war.”¹⁶ During the most critical part of the campaign, Stopford remained aboard the *Jonquil* because of a “sprained knee.” Indeed, when asked by Hamilton to accompany him on the beach, Stopford declined due to his sprained knee. The absence of critical corps leadership obviously put the landings in jeopardy from the beginning. Without a strong corps leader, the leadership would have to rely on a strong subordinate who would take on the critical decisions required for success and none was in a position to do so.¹⁷

Stopford’s key division commander Major General Hammersley, given the responsibility of the critical mission of securing the beach and securing the surrounding hills, was in no better shape. Hammersley had actually suffered a nervous breakdown in England. During the landings he was so mentally and physically exhausted that he completely removed himself from the situation to rest. In fact, Kitchener in early June

confided to Hamilton that General Hammersley "will have to be watched to see that the strain of trench warfare is not too much for him."¹⁸ General Sitwell, Hammersley's senior brigadier, was also suffering from mental and physical exhaustion on the first day of the campaign. Perhaps this may be in part a contributory factor to his inaction and continued argument for the need for his troops to rest and reorganize.

Several other cases of ill-health and mental fatigue occurred at Gallipoli and several occurred along the Western Front as well. General Lindley, commander of the 53rd Division at Suvla, would ask to be removed from command for being "unable to pull his division together."¹⁹ In other areas, British Lieutenant General James Grierson, selected to lead the II Corps in France, died enroute before even crossing the channel and Lieutenant General Archibald Murray suffered a complete nervous and physical collapse in August 1914.²⁰ The British Army adhered to the belief that gentlemanly respect for an individual's status and position were more important than were requirements for physical health or fitness.

In the same light, the British Army at Suvla Bay is filled with examples where respect for the institution of seniority was more important than the task to be done. General Mahon resigned in the midst of a battle for the Kiretch Tepe ridge on 16 August just ten days after the first landings. Despite the fact that his division was in an extensive and bloody battle, Mahon felt it more appropriate to resign from command because he was more senior than Stopford's temporary replacement. Next, despite the fact that his brigade had fouled up its initial landings and even still after his virtual refusal to move forward or assume any offensive action, Sitwell was selected to lead the assault on the

Chocolate Hills. While having three brigades temporarily under his command, Sitwell still showed reluctance to assume any offensive spirit and declined to accompany the brigades in their attack.

The personal nature of the system that produced the seniority and rank culture also brought forth a flawed concept of operational command. Stopford's and Hamilton's relationship fit conveniently with the leadership concept that Martin Samuels has termed "umpiring." Specifically, he defines umpiring as an the abdication of command responsibilities. The umpire leads by giving general direction to subordinates and then withdraws to let them accomplish the mission in whatever nature that the subordinates may choose. Samuels cites that the two most important umpires in the war were Hamilton and Haig.²¹ Haig's view of command was that "interference of superiors with details really pertaining to subordinates, paralyzes initiative. Hamilton's view was that "against the danger of a subaltern's mistake in the execution of his own job, it is but fair to set the risk of a meddlesome superior failing himself in the performance of another's business." It's clear by his actions in the April and August landings, Hamilton applied this rationale to the operational level and was continually reinforced in his practice by his Chief of Staff, General Braithwaite.²²

The umpire will often avoid interfering with subordinate out of respect for the subordinate's feelings and reputation. The relationship between the commander and the subordinate may actually become more important than the attainment of the objective. The cause of umpiring is generally related to the personalized army culture that we have previously discussed. The regimental system and the independence that it exercised was

perfect for this type of leadership. Regimental commanders were far from receptive of meddling division commanders and corps commanders who were viewed essentially as administrators. For a division commander to meddle in the affairs of colonel was thought to deny the commander on the spot the initiative and spontaneity needed. In the Imperial Army, who better to know what was needed than the regimental colonel who was on the scene. Before the war, divisions were only concentrated or together for six weeks of the year and barely four days were used for maneuvers. Most of the time was spent brigade against brigade, where the division commander would police or “umpire” his subordinate brigadiers in their battles with each other. The division commander would set scenarios, oversee their accomplishment, and then critique the outcome. He had very little time to practice his “craft” and became more adept to the umpire role than of a commander.²³ The problem was multiplied at the operational level where corps commanders rarely had the opportunity to command forces. In 1914, the British army had only one corps headquarters and only three men in active service who had commanded it. Command at the operational level in World War I was thus an entirely new and unique circumstance for the senior British army commanders and umpiring was a perfectly acceptable method where one gives the orders and then steps away to let subordinates carry them out.²⁴

Umpiring can also have the affect of ambiguity in orders. The umpire makes broad and general intent known in the operation and then leaves it to the subordinate to accomplish the task. Drawing a broad intent and assigning general objectives creates opportunities for subordinates to exploit. Problems with orders are left to the subordinate to handle and adapt. The problem with this system is that the umpire’s intent must be

abundantly clear and stated. Subordinates who infer may actually misinterpret the intent and this creates the need for continual communication.²⁵ As has been previously noted, the commanding general's intent was not clearly stated and the communication system of the IX Corps was almost non-existent.

Despite having his own staff create and plan the landings, Hamilton conceded to Stopford and his staff in changing two critical elements of the plan. The first aspect of the plan that changed was that, during the initial landings, a brigade was to land in the bay itself. Originally, "A" "B" and "C" beaches were contiguous and just south of Nibrunesi point. Stopford and staff felt that a landing should be made further north to facilitate a rapid disembarkment and the avoidance of trenches. The staff at GHQ was very much against this due to the uncharted nature of the bay and the Royal Navy's suspicion of sand bars and reefs in the area. The GHQ's suspicion about the sand bars was proven to be true while Stopford's suspicion of trenches was already known to be false. Nonetheless, Stopford was allowed to exercise authority over the landings and had the "A" beach changed.²⁶

The second and most critical element was the removal of the direction to take the Chocolate Hills and W Hills as soon as possible. The original orders required a *coup de main* to seize the hills before daylight, but Stopford believing that "it would be too difficult to do so quickly" had the order watered down. As to the purpose of the operation, the original orders would read:

The success of the plan will depend on two main factors: (1) The capture of Hill 305. (2) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base of operations for the northern army.

In regards to the high ground, the original order read:

It is of first importance that Yilghin and Ismail Ogula Tepe (Chocolate and W Hills) should be captured by a *coup de main* before daylight in order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay.

The revised orders would read:

Your primary objective will be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all the forces operating in the northern zone.

And in addressing the high ground around the bay, the revised orders stated:

If therefore, it is possible, without prejudice to the attainment of your primary objective, to gain these hills at an early period of attack, it will greatly facilitate the capture and retention of Hill 305.²⁷

By changing this, Stopford now had in essence changed Hamilton's overall intent, and Hamilton was content to let him do so. Hamilton was convinced Stopford was aware of the importance of the landings and apparently made little effort to emphasize further the importance of the overall operation to Stopford. Hamilton maintained final approval of the IX Corps plan and his approval allowed an already pessimistic Stopford the leeway he needed to view his action as a subordinate effort to the operations at Anzac Cove.

Stopford could then be completely satisfied that he was succeeding when, after twenty-four hours, his men had gotten ashore.

Another factor in the umpiring concept is evident in the distance Hamilton placed between himself and Stopford. Hamilton remained at GHQ on the island of Imbros two and a half hours away from the Suvla Bay area. This distance actually placed him much closer to the Anzac and Helles fronts where he had the utmost confidence in the

commanders of those forces. The distance was a clear impediment to communication between Hamilton and Stopford and it also conveys that Hamilton put himself in a position where he could not “interfere” with or counsel Stopford when needed. It confirms the notion that Hamilton was content to allow Stopford and his chief of staff a free hand in running his landings the way he wanted too. Hamilton thus inadvertently wasted the experience of his numerous staff officers and commanders who were much more familiar with the area, climate, and enemy. In doing so, he entrusted the details to individuals who were unfamiliar with the conditions of Suvla Bay and readily believed that the trench fighting on the Western Front was the great instructor of modern warfare.²⁸

An analysis of the communication between Stopford and GHQ reveals it too fits in the concept of umpiring. Stopford did not communicate the status of his position to Hamilton for nearly ten hours during the initial landings. All the while, Hamilton and his staff eagerly awaited his contact. The first communication between the landing force was not official at all, but a message from one operator to the other that stated “A little shelling at A has now ceased. All quiet at B.”²⁹ Hamilton remained awake during the night of the 6th and waited to hear the news. Instead of contacting the corps commander directly, he waited to hear from him. The message from operator to operator at two in the morning seemed enough for Hamilton, for it provided him with a renewed optimism. That optimism would shortly and rapidly disappear as very little news came forward. The first communication between Stopford and Hamilton did not occur until 1152 on 7 August, approximately fourteen hours after the first landings. The shocking revelation of the message was that Hill 10 was still not captured and “as you see we have been able to

advance little beyond the edge of the beach.” The shocking news alarmed Hamilton but was still not enough to jar him to action.³⁰

The Official British History maintains that GHQ exercised no influence over the course of the Suvla operations on 7 August and cites the Headquarters inactivity as one of the great crises of the war. The Official History cites GHQ’s “over-confidence” as the reason for the failure to intervene. The actual reason for the lack of intervention is more easily explained by the nature of Hamilton and his method of operational leadership. Hamilton’s methods can best be summarized by an earlier incident in April, when he discovered the lack of resistance at “Y” beach and instead of changing the sequence of landing himself, he waited for Hunter-Weston to agree, which he did not. Hamilton explains in his diary “My inclination was to take a hand myself in this affair but the staff are clear against interference when I have no knowledge of the facts. I suppose they are right.”³¹

Even when there was the evidence that the landings were not going well, Hamilton still did not want to interfere with his subordinate. It was not until 0900 on 8 August that Hamilton became concerned at the lack of progress by the IX Corps. However, instead of viewing the situation for himself, he sent a staff officer to inquire upon the status of the landing. This would have been a perfect time for Hamilton to accompany Stopford or at the very least discuss the situation more. Out of concern for the lack of information on the landings, and Stopford’s insistence that howitzers were needed to dislodge the strenuous opposition, Hamilton again failed to be directive in his dealing with Stopford. Hamilton sent a cable reporting that air patrols could discover no movement of Turkish

troops east of Tekke Tepe and that the original Turkish battalions had not yet been reinforced. The cable ended with another effort to guide but not direct Stopford, "Hope this indicates you will be able to gain a footing early on the Teke Tepe ridge, importance you will realize." An hour later Stopford responded with the following, "Heavy fighting yesterday and unavoidable delay landing artillery make me consider it inadvisable to call on troops to attack a strongly entrenched position without adequate support." Hamilton now finally acknowledged that he needed to go to the beach himself.³² Hamilton again must be faulted for allowing Stopford complete authority over the operation. In contrast, had Hamilton exercised some command influence, much the same way that von Sanders did when he replaced Feizi Bey with Mustafa Kemal, the operation could very well have been saved.³³

Stopford's relationship with Hammersley and Mahon also fits the umpiring concept. His desire not to interfere with his commanders in the midst of the mis-landings and intermixing of units can be counted as probably the greatest cause of the failure. Stopford unilaterally allowed Hammersley free conduct in the landings on the beaches. The best example of umpiring is expressed when, after Lieutenant Colonel Aspinall, the staff officer Hamilton sent to review the situation, pleaded with Stopford to initiate an offensive against the high ground as soon as possible. Stopford left the *Jonquil* for the first time to order an immediate offensive, instead of finding Hammersley, he found his staff officer, who stated that Hammersley was planning an offensive for the next day. Stopford readily backed away from his desire for an immediate offensive and agreed that the attack should begin at a time of Hammersley's own choosing.³⁴

The decision by Stopford to remain aboard his ship for the first three days greatly impaired his ability to communicate with subordinate commanders at critical points in the landings. His logic nearly mirrors Hamilton's logic in that he wished to remain in a central location so that he could have equal access to both divisions. Stopford's apparent indifference to communicating with his division commanders acknowledges the fact that he desired to remain a safe distance away from the operation to avoid interfering with it. His limited direction to Hammersley and his rapid acceptance of Hammersley's excuses also reinforces the umpiring concept.

The third attribute of the culture is a stark contrast to the concept of umpiring. Umpiring sets broad aims for the subordinate and allows him to conduct the fight as he sees fit. Astonishingly, tactical units at the brigade level were more closely influenced by the system of restrictive control where adherence to higher commanders orders and rigid following of orders was required. The rigidity resulting from restrictive control at the tactical level produced a vicious circle wherein the more adherence to strict regulations was insisted upon, the more individual initiative became repressed. Restrictive control is a system in which initiative and innovation are discouraged. Particularly at the regimental level, initiative and independent thought were not encouraged. As author Tim Travers has said of the officer corps of the tactical units, "intellect was despised, professional curiosity largely absent and frank and open discussion suppressed. The army's only sustained intellectual activity appeared to be the protection of officers' reputations."³⁵

British soldiers were brought up with the idea that obedience is more important than initiative. Restrictive control led to a distinct rigidity and inflexibility in the action of

subordinate formations.³⁶ In some instances in France, divisions would actually determine the positions of companies. A critical component of the restrictive control system is the process and production of rigid and detailed orders. Detailed orders produced at the division level are usually based on the perceptions of the commander and his staff. Since the staff's location is usually several miles behind the situation, its officers are more likely to possess inaccurate and out-of-date information. Frequently, requests to exploit opportunities are often ignored on the grounds that they do not accord with the orders given.³⁷

The first example tends to be the lack of dissemination of the plans to lower level officers. GHQ's desire to keep the operation secret to the last moment displays evidence that they did not trust or exercise confidence in their lower levels of leadership. This fits with restrictive control in that the battalion commander will tell the subordinates step by step what he wants them to do. The unfortunate loss of leaders at this level then left the remaining officers with little knowledge of the mission or the objectives. This is most clearly represented in the action of the Yorkshire battalions deciding not to attack Hill 10 but instead laying down and waiting for more orders. The lack of initiative on the part of the Yorkshire battalions was consistent with the idea of restrictive control and it vividly illustrates the problem associated with it. Restrictive control was thought to have worked well with these New Army units because they were thought to be incapable of anything but following the simple and direct orders of their officers. However, their junior officers, usually given very detailed instructions, were now bereft of any direction and uninformed about subsequent objectives. Their best solution was to wait until someone tells them

what to do next. Of the three critical brigadiers in the 11th Division, none was to exercise the initiative on 7 August. While some could clearly see that the Chocolate and W Hills needed to be captured, none were willing to step forward and make it happen. It had not only to be coordinated with the Division but also ordered by it. In further testimony, Brigadier General Nicol of the 30th Brigade failed to move against barely three companies on Kiretch Tepe ridge, because his orders were to proceed to the ridge and support the battalion already there. Had he pressed forward with his brigade, the entire northern side from Suvla to Ejelmer Bay including Teke Tepe would have been free of Turks and the course of the entire operation changed.³⁸

Hammersley's production and canceling of orders is clear evidence also of the restrictive nature of the command culture at lower levels. Hammersley in the span of three and a half hours had produced three sets of written orders, each set canceling its predecessor. This is clear that instead of general intent, and having the brigade commanders exercise any initiative, they must be instructed by written orders and provided with specific times, places, and individuals.

Another factor that contributed to the failure was the secrecy in which plan was developed. Hamilton was convinced of the utmost need for secrecy and put stringent rules on the dissemination of information on the landing. The corps commander only first learned of the objective and plan fifteen days before its initiation.³⁹ Subsequently, tactical commanders at the battalion and company level only learned of their objectives hours before they were to disembark. Objectives were not clearly defined to junior officers and this contributed to the inertia of the corps on the 8th of August.

Apart from cultural aspects, other factors of the operation must also be examined to evaluate their effect on the failure. The first to be examined is the influence of the British New Army units. In defending his conduct before the Dardanelles Commission, Stopford declared that he did not have the right kind of troops for the mission. He felt his Territorial Divisions had the best units removed before the landing and felt that the New Army troops were not up to equal of the prewar armies. In his defense, the New Army troops were completely inexperienced and untested in combat.

The New Army units of the 10th and 11th Divisions were entirely different from their counterparts in the Regular British Army. Comparatively few of these men had served in the armed forces before 1914 and the millions that volunteered for service would never have done so under normal conditions. Many of the men had enlisted in the patriotic rush of August and September 1914. Britain was besieged by recruits, all rushing to answer Kitchener's call to arms. The rush included men from all walks of life regardless of occupation or skill. The standards and requirements for recruits were often ignored and many who were mentally or physically unfit slipped through the process.⁴⁰

The recruiting and enlistment system was totally swamped by the demands and failed to adequately control the situation. Before the war, no more than 37,000 recruits a year had ever entered the army and in the span of two months over a million had joined. Eventually, almost 20% of the British population served in the armed forces. In all, thirty New Army divisions were formed during the war. In addition to obvious logistical problems associated with the surge in numbers was the regular army's mechanism used to train them. Britain's system of training broke down under the strain.⁴¹

The task of training the new recruits would have been difficult at best, but with losses that amounted to almost 25 percent of the officer corps in the first four months of the war, the task was near impossible. A problem that multiplied the inadequacy of the New Army training system was that the priority of training went to replacing individuals and officers in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). Officers for the New Army units were difficult to come by and many were of the “dug out” or retired variety. The last of the New Army battalions would in some cases only end up with only one Regular Army officer in their ranks and he would usually be the commanding officer. However, the 10th and 11th Divisions in service at Suvla Bay were fortunate in that all their battalion and company commanders were Regular Army officers.⁴²

Two other factors may have also affected the performance of the New Army units. First the realization that the New Army units were characterized by low standards of training and inexperience led some army leaders to believe they were only capable of the most simplest of tactics. The officers therefore furthered the idea that to command these troops required rigid and restrictive control methods. The second factor is that Regular Army officers could depend on Regular Army Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to lead their platoons. New Army NCOs suffered from the same failings in training that affected the New Army troops. British officers then may have exposed and expended themselves to make up for the inexperience of the other ranks. The loss of officers equated to a loss of initiative as according to the British Official History, “When British troops lost their officers, they were...apt to fall back, not because they were beaten but because they did not know what to do and expected to receive fresh orders.”⁴³

At Suvla Bay, the British committed raw troops to a task that would be difficult for even proven combat veterans. All units sent to serve in France were introduced to the rigors of the front line gradually and were given time to accustom themselves before being called on to accomplish a major offensive. At Suvla Bay, Stopford's New Army divisions were thrust into one of the largest amphibious assaults in history. Stopford's troops had been training for the stationary trench combat of France and not the maneuver warfare that was required at Suvla Bay. However, the troops of the New Army divisions at Suvla Bay showed the courage and determination needed to win when they were properly led.⁴⁴

The finger of blame has often been pointed to the plan itself as a factor in the failure of the landings. The plan was ambitious given its requirement to land three brigades in the first hour, and over 10,000 in the first eight hours. However, the main reason for the ambitious landing was to ensure the effect of surprise. In this respect, the plan was a great success. The first three brigades landed unopposed with the first fighting only occurring after the brigades attacked the outpost at Lala Bala. Even though the first brigades accomplished their landing well behind schedule, they completely surprised the Turkish defenders and the original objectives were there all but for the asking. Perhaps the best defense of the plan comes from the Turkish Official History, "The British plan for the Suvla landing, and the operations leading up to it, were well suited to the requirements of the situation....Had this plan executed with resolution and energy it would have effected very far reaching results."⁴⁵

The failure of the IX Corps is firmly rooted in the cultural aspects common to the British Army in the first years of the war. The traditions that evolved from the Victorian

customs had kept the army proficient for guarding the Empire's possessions, but not for a continental war or the harsh conditions of the Dardanelles. Despite the stalemate of the war in France and the difficult experiences of the April landings in the Dardanelles, the Army failed to adapt to the situation and clung to its prewar concepts. The military leaders of Britain never fully recognized the potential of Dardanelles campaign and were compelled to treat it as a side effort. The army provided the campaign with a corps commander devoid of experience and of questionable ability who was as unprepared for the operation as any one could be. He and his immediate superior's command style of umpiring at the operational level and the exercise of rigid control at the tactical level guided the operation to disaster.

¹ Tim Travers, *The Killing Ground* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 27.

² Martin Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914* (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 1995), 54.

³ Ian Becket, *The British Army, 1914-1918: The Illusion of Change*, Turner, John. (ed) *Britain and the First World War* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), The British Regular Army was divided into brigade districts and each contained two battalions of infantry. The brigade was purely administrative and the purpose of the dual battalions was to have one based in the United Kingdom and the other overseas. Although in the same brigade, the links between the battalions were very weak and the two battalions were rarely, if ever, in the same location at the same time. Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914*, 53-54.

⁴ Travers, *The Killing Ground*, 6-7.

⁵ Ibid., 26-27.

⁶ J.M. Bourne, "British Generals in the First World War," G. D. Sheffield, ed. *Leadership and Command The Anglo-American Military Experience Since 1861* (London: Brassey's 1997), 94-95.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914*, 40. According to Samuels the entrance examination was more a test of determination and endurance than of intellect or reasoning. The test consisted of 42 hours of examination given over a period of two weeks.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 47.

¹¹ Travers, *The Killing Ground*, 44-47.

¹² Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914*, 58-60.

¹³ J.F.C. Fuller, *Generalship Its Diseases and Their Cure*, (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936), 56. Fuller's brazen book about the personal factors of command was one of the first works critical of the traditional seniority system of the British Army.

¹⁴ Sir Ian Standish Monteith Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary, Vol I* (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1920), 285-302.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-307.

¹⁶ Mackenzie, *Gallipoli Memories*, 275.

¹⁷ Brigadier-General C.F. Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II* (London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1929), 279. General Stopford did visit the beach on one occasion before the arrival of Hamilton. However, he sprained his knee shortly after his arrival and quickly returned to his ship.

¹⁸ Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary, Vol II*, 328.

¹⁹ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 327.

²⁰ Travers, *The Killing Ground*, 14.

²¹ Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914*, 49.

²² *Ibid.*, 50-51.

²³ *Ibid.*, 50-57.

²⁴ Ibid., 55-58.

²⁵ Ibid., 51-52.

²⁶ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 150-151. The reason Stopford and his staff wanted the “A” beach location changed is that they believed a landing inside the bay would “facilitate” the attack on the Chocolate and W Hills with a northern assault.

²⁷ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II, Appendix Vol II*, 15-23.

²⁸ Eliot Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes The Anatomy of Failure in War* (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 150-152. Stopford’s Chief of Staff was Brigadier General H. L. Reed, a competent staff officer who had won the Victorian Cross. However, he made a poor combination when paired with Stopford and probably greatly fostered Stopford’s apprehension over trenches. Additionally, Stopford commanded the VIII Corps on the static Helles front for three days in order to become acclimatized to the situation and the environment, which probably also added to his concern about trenches.

²⁹ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 247.

³⁰ Ibid., 263-264.

³¹ Hamilton, *Gallipoli Diary, Vol II*, 147.

³² Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 273.

³³ Philip J. Haythornthwaite, *Gallipoli 1915 Frontal Assault on Turkey*, (London: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1991), 76.

³⁴ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 277-278. The staff officer sent by Hamilton would later become a British General and penned the *Official History* of the Gallipoli campaign. Aspinall-Oglander’s Official History is extremely accurate and detailed, however, he very carefully avoids placing blame on individuals and generally avoids criticizing individuals or the Army’s methods.

³⁵ Bourne, *British Generals in the First World War*, 110. From Travers and *The Killing Ground*, 3-39.

³⁶ Samuels, *British Dogma*, 138-139.

³⁷ Ibid., 147-148.

³⁸ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*, 270.

³⁹ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol I*, 331.

⁴⁰ Samuels, *British Dogma*, 154-157.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 150-151.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 151.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 158.

⁴⁴ Aspinall-Oglander, *Military Operations: Gallipoli, Vol II*,

⁴⁵ Turkish General Staff *Official Historical Account of the Dardanelles Campaign*. Translation [S.L.]: Army War College, 1925, 46.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

The English lacked the ability to extract the utmost from their success. Their methods were responsible for it, because they were not based on any war experience. Experience of colonial wars was of no use here.

General Hans Kannengiesser, *The Campaign in Gallipoli*

The most resounding issue revealed in this analysis of Suvla Bay is the extent to which a previously successful military organization was rendered completely ineffective by the influence of its own culture. The British failures that were long attributed to poor leadership and communication are now more accurately attributed to cultural and systemic failures. In essence, the British Army lost at Suvla Bay because its senior commander was unable to effectively direct an operational subordinate and because it rigidly adhered to an outdated system of tactical command. These two factors are more the result of traditional methods of command and less representative of British leadership. Organizations, especially those that have undergone rapid expansion or tumultuous changes, must be able to recognize the need to adapt or change elements of their culture. The significance of Suvla Bay to modern military organizations is that it vividly demonstrates what may happen to successful organizations when they become too embedded within their culture and consequently fail to recognize the need for change.

The personalized command culture that worked effectively in British colonial operations was completely inadequate for warfare at Gallipoli and Suvla Bay. The British Army placed its trust in leaders who were all products of a successful colonial army.

British spirit, leadership, and ingenuity, had created an unmatched colonial empire and there seemed no reason why those same traditions and organizations could not successfully overcome the obstacles of modern warfare. The inability of the British leaders to recognize the flaw of applying traditional methods of command on new and substantially different army organizations resulted in the catastrophic defeat of an entire British corps by a force of less than 1,500 Turks.

This analysis has revealed three relevant aspects of the British command culture that inhibited the IX Corps from achieving any measure of success at Suvla Bay. The first aspect regards the extraordinary emphasis the British command system placed on seniority. The British culture had evolved into a system that favored years in service and dates of rank over ability and competence. The appointment of Sir Frederick Stopford to command the IX Corps was based entirely on his seniority within the standing British rank structure. No one within the British high command made a worthwhile attempt to analyze his ability or experience nor was any analysis of his ability considered necessary. In the British system, designating command or promoting an individual to senior rank simply because he was the most senior, was a common and acceptable practice. The eventual result of this practice was a corps of senior leaders devoid of initiative and ability and aged to the point where their physical health adversely affected their performance.

The second aspect of culture relates to the British doctrine of restrictive control wherein tactical commanders were not trusted or encouraged to act on their own. The British system had determined the best method to win in war was to maintain order and organization on the battlefield. Friction had to be erased and the British method to

accomplish it was through detailed orders and explicit directions.¹ Over time, this system virtually eliminated any concept of initiative among the British officer corps. At Suvla Bay, all the situations where an aggressive tactical commander could have saved the operation by exercising their own initiative, were methodically and tragically ignored.

The third and most significant aspect of the command culture is the institutional method of umpiring practiced by the senior commanders at Suvla Bay. General Hamilton persisted in applying the same style of command to Stopford and the IX Corps that he used with his proven and experienced subordinates. He allowed Stopford to make drastic and ultimately lethal changes to his intricately developed plan. Moreover, at the most critical point of the operation, Hamilton opted not to intervene with his subordinate. Remarkably, even given the significance of the operation and its potential, Hamilton still could not convince himself to interfere with a subordinate of which he had little confidence. Had Hamilton acted appropriately, and imposed his will on a timid subordinate, the British surely could have achieved a large degree of success at Suvla Bay.

In contrast to the British system and its inflexibility, the German culture and system was highly flexible and adaptable. The German advisors to the Ottoman Empire effectively placed their system of command on the Turkish Army. The German system and its use of General Staff Officers placed great emphasis on ability and potential instead of status and position or length of service. Additionally, its directive control system favored decentralization of command not just at senior levels but even at lower tactical levels. The superiority of this system over restrictive control demonstrates the fact that “a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier and compensate for weaknesses

in other fields, such as numerical inferiority.”² In sum, the German system encouraged initiative at all levels and was abundantly more flexible and adaptable, especially to the unique conditions at Suvla Bay. Both Hamilton and von Sanders were equally brilliant military officers, but the startling difference in their action reveals the extent that they were both products of two inherently different and conflicting organizational cultures.

Cultural analysis is important and necessary if we desire to understand how organizations, especially military organizations, are influenced by their traditional beliefs. Organizations, whether religious, academic, business, or military all operate within a pattern of shared beliefs or assumptions that constitute their organizational culture. Cultural norms influence the behavior of the members of the organization and in mature organizations may eventually guide or even dictate the organization’s activities. The task of changing cultural norms is extremely difficult even when change is critical to the survival of the organization. Most organizations encounter great difficulty when attempting to change because cultures by their nature, resist change.³ Military organizations are especially vulnerable to this phenomenon because military organizations are far less flexible and exceptionally more rigid than non-military organizations.⁴ This is particularly true if the culture has been successful in the past, as with the case of the British colonial army.

Leaders are critical to the change process because they are entrusted to manage the cultural evolution and change of the organization. Leaders who are not conscious of the culture or too embedded within it, will eventually become managed by the culture. Senior leaders also exercise the privilege of selecting criteria for future leaders, and by

doing so, are able to perpetuate the prevailing culture. In military organizations, outsiders are not able to fulfill the demands of military leadership and hence, new military leaders are almost always of a similar culture of the leaders that they replaced. In cultures that have had a long history of success, senior leaders find it substantially more difficult to change the organization.⁵ In fact, dominant leaders of the culture may even attempt to preserve or enhance a culture even as it declines. Hamilton and the leaders of the IX Corps are classic examples of how military leaders became managed by their culture and unable to effectively recognize the need to change.⁶

The British fiasco at Suvla Bay forcefully suggests that military organizations must possess the ability and willingness to adapt to change elements of their culture. The traditions and beliefs of the British Army evolved into an organizational culture that produced the world's greatest overseas empire. That same culture thwarted its chances for success against continental armies on the battlefields of the World War. Ultimately, the influence of the British personalized command culture inhibited its leaders from acting appropriately and eventually cost the British Army its prestige, confidence, and most tragically, tens of thousands of British lives.

¹ Martin Samuels, *Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1914* (London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd. 1995), 94-103.

² Martin Van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 4.

³ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1990), 2d ed., 297-312.

⁴ Michael Howard, "Military Science in an Age of Peace," *RUSI, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* (March 1974), 3-9.

⁵Shein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 15.

⁶Ibid., 305.

APPENDIX A

ORDER OF BATTLE IX CORPS SUVLA BAY (Principal Units Only)

10th IRISH DIVISION

29th Brigade (ATTACHED TO ANZAC)

10th Hampshire Regiment
6th Royal Irish Rifles
5th Connaught Rangers
6th Leinster Regiment

30th Brigade

6th Royal Munster Fusiliers
7th Royal Munster Fusiliers
6th Royal Dublin Fusiliers
7th Royal Dublin Fusiliers

31st Brigade

5th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers
6th Royal Irish Fusiliers

Pioneer Battalion

5th Royal Irish Regiment

11th NORTHERN DIVISION

32d Brigade

9th West Yorkshire Regiment
6th Green Howards
8th Duke of Wellington's Regiment
6th York and Lancaster Regiment

33rd Brigade

- 6th Lincolnshire Regiment
- 6th Border Regiment
- 7th Staffordshire Regiment
- 9th Sherwood Foresters

34th Brigade

- 8th Northumberland Fusiliers
- 9th Lancashire Fusiliers
- 5th Dorsetshire Regiment
- 11th Manchester Regiment

Pioneer Battalion

- 6th East Yorkshire Regiment

13th WESTERN DIVISION (ATTACHED TO ANZAC)**38th Brigade**

- 6th King's Own Regiment
- 6th East Lancashire Regiment
- 6th South Lancashire Regiment
- 6th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment

39th Brigade

- 9th Royal Warwickshire Regiment
- 7th Gloucestershire Regiment
- 9th Worcestershire Regiment
- 7th North Staffordshire Regiment

40th Brigade

- 8th Cheshire Regiment
- 8th Royal Welsh Fusiliers
- 4th South Wales Borderers
- 5th Wiltshire Regiment

Pioneer Battalion

- 8th Welsh Regiment

53rd WELSH DIVISION

158th Brigade

- 5th Royal Welsh Fusiliers
- 6th Royal Welsh Fusiliers
- 7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers
- 1st Hereford Regiment

159th Brigade

- 4th Cheshire Regiment
- 7th Cheshire Regiment
- 4th Welsh Regiment
- 5th Welsh Regiment

160th Brigade

- 4th Queen's Regiment
- 4th Royal Sussex Regiment
- 4th Royal West Kent Regiment
- 10th Middlesex Regiment

54th EAST ANGLIAN DIVISION

161st Brigade

- 4th Essex Regiment
- 5th Essex Regiment
- 6th Essex Regiment
- 7th Essex Regiment

162nd Brigade

- 5th Bedfordshire Regiment
- 4th Northamptonshire Regiment
- 10th London Regiment
- 11th London Regiment

163rd Brigade

- 4th Norfolk Regiment
- 5th Norfolk Regiment
- 5th Suffolk Regiment
- 8th Hampshire Regiment

APPENDIX B

PRINCIPAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS SUVLÀ BAY LANDING 6-10 AUGUST 1915

DATE/TIME	UNIT/INDIVIDUAL	ACTIVITY	IMPACT
22 Jul	General Stopford	Receives plan for first review, endorses plan praises plan developer.	Provides Hamilton and GHQ with renewed confidence and optimism.
26 Jul	General Stopford	Request changes in plan because of misguided belief of Turkish entrenchments in Suvla area, believes capturing high ground before dawn too difficult.	Final instructions changed, specific order to capture Choclate/W Hills is removed, replaced with recommendation, Stopford given free hand in all preparations.
6 Aug/1430	IX Corps Units	First distribution/dissemination to tactical units, some units receive plan/orders while loading onto lighters.	Late distribution of orders results in many tactical units (Companies/battalions) and their commanders unaware of specific objectives/tasks.
6 Aug/1830	IX Corps Units	First units begin loading into lighters from destroyers.	Some units on feet for 17 hours, most units have men would have already been awake for 24+ hours before the landing. Causes severe fatigue before landing.
6 Aug/2130	32d/33d Brigades	First units land at "B" and "C" beach.	Provides Stopford, Hammersley, and Sitwell, excuse for inaction, i.e. men can't move forward, need rest.
6 Aug/2200	33rd Brigade	Establishes entrenched position from sea to Salt Lake.	Initial landing accomplished without incident, small beachhead secured.
6 Aug/2230	34th Brigade	Lighters land men in wrong position on "A" beach, second wave of lighters strike reef, troops are forced to wade ashore.	Secures right flank of beachhead.
			Delays entire landing of 34th Brigade, battalions and companies become intermixed, adds to confusion and misidentification of geographic references. Delays Brigade's attack on Hill 10.

DATE/TIME	UNIT/INDIVIDUAL	ACTIVITY	IMPACT
6 Aug '2300	32d Brigade (6th Yorkshire)	Captures outpost on Lala Bala, men told initially to use only bayonets, battalion proceeds to Hill 10 and waits for 34th Brigade.	Large proportion of officers killed and remaining troops unaware of what to do next. Remaining leaders wait for new orders. Pushes timing behind schedule, troops do not attack the lightly defended Hill 10 and wait for 34th Brigade.
7 Aug '0045	General Hammersley	Lands with staff and sets up Headquarters on beach.	Fails to fully assess situation and timing.
7 Aug '0430	34th Brigade	Last units disembark from lighters.	Brigade now five hours late, less than two hours to sunrise, pushes entire plan behind schedule.
7 Aug '0600	General Stopford 31st Brigade	Redirects 10th Division troops to land at "C" beach to avoid problems encountered at "A" beach by 34th Brigade, transfers control of battalions "temporarily" to General Hammersley of 11th Division.	Order causes major confusion in units, 31st Brigade is landed six miles from original objective of Kiretch Tepe ridge. Units of two divisions are now intermixed on crowded beaches.
7 Aug '0600	Major Willmer	First message to von Sanders, urgently requests reinforcements.	Plans to reposition men around W Hills and prepares to send artillery away to prevent its capture.
7 Aug '0630	General Haggard 32d Brigade	Attack and capture of Hill 10.	Secures the beachhead for the remaining landings, but attack is well behind schedule and primary objectives not taken during hours of darkness.
7 Aug 0700	General von Sanders	Orders two divisions from the north, one division from south to Suvla Bay.	Divisions need 36-48 hours to arrive, less than 1,500 men defending against the British.
7 Aug 0530-0920	General Hammersley	Issues 3 different orders, each one canceling it's predecessor, places 31st Brigade and BG Haggard under Sitwell's control. Issues conflicting orders both written and verbal to BG Hill and 31st Brigade to attack Chocolate Hill and W Hill. Orders contradict those given to Sitwell.	Causes confusion as to objectives, inhibits BG Hill and 31st Brigade from moving to original objective at Kiretch Tepe.
7 Aug '0800	General Sitwell	Indecision. Makes request to adopt defensive position, wants to dig in along a line barely one mile from beach. His troops remain exposed and unorganized around his position on the beach.	Morale of troops begins to break under inactivity, constant Turkish sniper attacks, fatigue, and lack of water.
7 Aug '0950	General Hammersley	Cancels BG Hill's new orders to attack the Chocolate Hills and issues a newer set of orders for the 31st, 32d, and 34th Brigade to attack Chocolate Hills only. Attack to be carried out by BG Sitwell.	Causes further delay in operation, plan further behind schedule, attack on strategic W Hill is left out of new order, brigade commanders unsure of what to do next.

DATE/TIME	UNIT/INDIVIDUAL	ACTIVITY/EVENT	IMPACT
7 Aug/1100	General Nicol/30th Brigade	First units begin to land, complete brigade won't land until 1800.	11th Division units now greatly behind schedule and key 31st Brigade still under control of 10th Div Cmdr
7 Aug/1200	General Haggard	Wounded in action by Turkish shell-fire.	Key "aggressive" brigadier is out of action, command of his Brigade passes to Colonel Minogue who is located several miles away with his battalion. Other Brigade commanders wait for his arrival.
7 Aug/1200	IX Corps	Fails to land supplies and mules. Of 960 mules planned to be landed on the 7th, only 50 are ashore.	Troops in desperately need of supplies, mules are needed to transport water. Chief Corps Engineer unable to accomplish task, has health breakdown on 9 Aug.
7 Aug/1200	General Stopford	First message to Hamilton, gives position as of 0730, "you see we have been able to advance little beyond the edge of the beach."	Lack of progress concerns GHQ. Unable to comprehend problems on the beach against no Turks. GHQ responds with telegram only desiring more news of situation, Hamilton still optimistic.
7 Aug/1530	General Hammersley	Final set of orders to Sitwell to attack Chocolate Hill.	Attack long overdue, won't begin until after dark.
7 Aug/1900	General Sitwell	Attack on Chocolate Hill with three brigades, none of the three brigadiers accompany their brigades.	Poorly coordinated attack conducted by three brigades, Chocolate Hill taken (18 hours late) with high number of casualties. 673 total British casualties against only 500 Turkish defenders.
7 Aug/2100	General Nicol/30th Brigade	Follows orders to simply move along Kiretch Tepe in support, makes no effort to move forward to capture entire ridge.	Turks retain Kiretch Tepe ridge with less than 300 men against entire British brigade.
8 Aug/0630	General Hammersley	Sends message to Stopford, he has secured the beach, after uneventful and quiet night. Mahon sends message that Turks are in strong position on Kiretch Tepe ridge.	Hammersley fails to order any advance against any position, less than 1,300 Turks now defending area. Stopford satisfied beach is in British possession, believes Turks are entrenched. Less than 300 Turks defending Kiretch Tepe ridge.
8 Aug/0900	General Hamilton	Concerned about lack of news, sends Staff officer to investigate.	Hamilton concerned, but still only sends staff officer. Convinced he should stay in central location to other fronts. Staff officer finds conditions on the beach "resembling 'a bank holiday,'" no forward movement by any of the units.
8 Aug/1050	General Stopford	Cables to Hamilton, he is consolidating position on the beach.	Hamilton now extremely concerned and prepares to go to Suvla Bay.
8 Aug/1130	General Stopford	Orders divisions forward, but only against lightly defended areas and not to attack entrenched positions.	Gives division commanders leeway to not advance.

DATE/TIME	UNIT/INDIVIDUAL	ACTIVITY	IMPACT
8 Aug/1100	General Hamilton	Prepares to check on situation himself. His transport breaks and he is unable to arrive on scene until 1800.	Lack of resolute leadership causes critical delays, high ground still undefended, but no action taken by any of the 22 Battalions at Suvla Bay.
8 Aug/1800	General Hamilton	Arrives, discusses situation with Stopford and Hammersley, orders immediate attack. Hammersley pleads he needs to wait until next day to mount the attack.	Continued critical delays, Turks in route to the high ground.
8 Aug/1900	Hammersley	Hammersley issues orders to attack Tepe Teke ridge. Orders 32d Brigade to conduct attack. Brigade commander unaware of position of all battalions and moves to consolidate them before the attack.	Consolidation pulls two battalions already well forward and less than 30 minutes from objective back to the beach position. Takes nearly 4 hours to consolidate the brigade.
9 Aug/0330	32d Brigade	Attack commences against Tepe Teke almost 10 hours after Hamilton orders an immediate attack. Turks arrive less than 30 minutes before British.	British fail to take Tepe Teke and incur heavy losses, failure allows Turks to occupy all high terrain and dig entrenchments. All effect of surprise landing is lost, Turkish reinforcements continue to arrive.
10 Aug	IX Corps	Unable to organize attack against any Turkish position.	Battles continue through month of August, but British forces are unable to obtain any ground and essentially hold the same positions they held on 7 August. Stopford is replaced on the 15th of August and Hamilton is replaced in September.

APPENDIX C

FIRST INSTRUCTIONS FROM G.H.Q. TO IX CORPS FOR SUVLA OPERATIONS

22 July 1915

1. The General Commanding wishes me to send you the following outline of his plans for the next general attack, for the exclusive information of yourself, your divisional generals, and such officers of your Corps Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it necessary to take into your confidence. **I am to add that it is Sir Ian's wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted with it.**
2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy as possible in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of our attack on the Turkish forces now opposite the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. It is hoped, by means of an attack on the front and right flank of these forces, to deal them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south towards Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Commanding to seize a position across the Peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos, with a protected line of supply from Suvla Bay.
3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the present time is about 30,000 men. Of these, some 12,000 are permanently maintained in the trenches opposite the Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder are held in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eskei-Keui. It is believed that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages, a battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (Chocolate Hill and Green Hill), a battalion near Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba. The hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Ejelmer Bay are believed to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but information on this point is at present not precise. The hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4-7-in. gun, one 9-2-in. gun and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements and infantry trenches, but it is believed that the main defences are against attack from the south or West, and that there is no wire on the northern slopes of the hills; also that the guns can only be fired in a southerly direction.
4. The success of the plan outlined in para. 2 will depend on two main factors:-
 - (a) The capture of Hill 305.
 - (b) **The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base of operations for the northern army.**
5. The operations from within the present Anzac position against the enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Corps, temporarily reinforced by the following units of the 9th Army Corps:

13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades,
R.F.A.).

29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division).

29th Indian Brigade.

69th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A.

6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and you will have at your disposal:

11th Division.

10th Division (less 29th Brigade).

Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade.

1st/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade.

The disembarkation of your command, which may be expected to be opposed, though not in great strength, will be after dark, at a point immediately south of Lala Baba. The first troops to disembark will be the 11th Division, which will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness in destroyers and motor-lighters. It is expected that approximately 4,000 men will be disembarked simultaneously, and that three infantry brigades and the mountain artillery brigade will be ashore before daylight.

Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe. It will also be necessary to send a small force to secure a footing on the hills due east of Suvla Bay. **It is of first importance that Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe should be captured by a *coup de main* before daylight in order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay. It is hoped that one division will be sufficient for the attainment of these objectives.**

Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances which cannot at present be gauged, but it is hoped that the remainder of your force will be available on the morning of 7th August to advance on Biyuk Anafarta with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305, so as to assist General Birdwood's attack.

7. The operations from within the present Anzac position will begin during the day immediately preceding your disembarkation (the reinforcements for General Birdwood's force having been dribbled ashore in detachments at Anzac Cove on the three previous nights). The operations will begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left centre, Lonesome Pine Johnston's Jolly, with the object of attracting the enemy's reserves to this portion of the line. The Turks have for long been apprehensive of our landing in the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an attack in force in this quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At nightfall, the Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three or more columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk Bair. This advance, which will begin about the same time as your first troops reach the shore, will be so timed as to reach the summit of the main ridge near Chunuk Bair 0230 AM (soon after moon-rise).

Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this ridge do not extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength.

As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge, a portion of the attacking force will be left to consolidate the position gained and the remainder will advance south-west against the enemy's trenches near Baby 700, which will be attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from within the Anzac position.

An advance by your force from the east will, as already indicated in para. 6, be of great assistance in the event of this attack being checked.

8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of your force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No animals or vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the first instance, and machine guns, tools and necessary medical and signalling equipment must be carried by hand. All men will land with two iron rations (one day's meat ration only is advised); infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and machine gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs and greatcoats will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is hoped to land enough horses to secure the mobility of the mountain artillery brigade and one battery R.F.A., and it is hoped that within the first 24 hours the disembarkation of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in the attached table will be complete.

One brigade, R.F.A., 2nd Division, 1/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade (two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery will be landed at Anzac before the operations begin, and their personnel and horses will disembark on the morning following your disembarkation, and will then be directed along the beach to join your command. Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the disembarkation of water carts, a number of mules with special eight-gallon water bags will be attached to the units of your command.

W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

P.S.-This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession, and if, as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-General G.S., it must be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer.

TABLE

PERSONNEL.	ANIMALS.	VEHICLES.
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11TH DIVISION.

Div. H.Q. and Signal Co.	28	1 cart, 2 cable wagons.
3 Infantry Brigades	108	Nil.
Pioneer Battalion	8	Nil.
2 F.A. Brigades	506	32 guns, 88 wagons, 2 telegraph wagons, 10 carts.
1 Heavy Battery, R.G.A.	45	4 guns, 4 wagons, 2 G.S. wagons, 1 cart.
3 Field Cos., R.E.	48	12 tool carts.
2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co.	Nil.	62 bicycles.
3 Field Ambulances	144	30 ambulances, 12 carts.

10TH DIVISION.

Divl. H.Q. and Signal Co.
2 Infantry Brigades
Pioneer Battalion

PERSONNEL.	ANIMALS.	VEHICLES.
3 Field Cos., R.E.		Transport on approximately
3 Field Ambulances		the same scale as that for
2 Mountain Batteries	80	11th Division.
2 Battalions (of 500 men each) for beach parties.		
Mule Corps	300	150 carts
3 Casualty Clearing Stations		

APPENDIX D

FINAL INSTRUCTIONS FROM G.H.Q. TO IX CORPS FOR SUVLA OPERATIONS

G.S.R.Z. 18/2

1. The intentions of the General Commanding for the impending operations, and a rough outline of the task which he has allotted to the troops under your command, were communicated to you in my G.S.R.Z. 18, dated 22nd inst.

2. In addition to the information contained in Para 3 of the above quoted letter, small numbers of Turkish mounted troops and Gendarmerie have been reported in the country north of Anzac, and three guns with limbers, each drawn by six oxen, have been seen moving, into Anafarta Sagir. An aeroplane photograph has also disclosed the presence of a few trenches on Lala Baba. A sketch of these trenches, which have apparently been constructed for some months, is attached. It is believed that the channel connecting the Salt Lake with Suvla Bay is now dry.

3. Your landing will begin on the night 6th/7th August. Your primary objective will be to secure Suvla Bay as a base for all the forces operating in the northern zone. Owing to the difficult nature of the terrain, it is possible that the attainment of this objective will, in the first instance, require the use of the whole of the troops at your disposal. Should, however, you find it possible to achieve this object with only a portion of your force, your next step will be to give such direct assistance as is in your power to the General Officer Commanding Anzac in his attack on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk Anafarta, with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of that hill.

4. Subject only to his final approval, the General Commanding gives you an entirely free hand in the selection of your plan of operations.

He, however, directs your special attention to the fact that the hills, Yilghin and Ismail Oglu Tepe, are known to contain guns which can bring fire to bear on the flank and rear of an attack on Hill 305 and that on this account they assume an even greater importance in the first instance than if they were considered merely part of a position covering Suvla Bay. If, therefore, it is possible, without prejudice to the attainment of your primary objective, to gain possession of these hills at an early period of your attack, it will greatly facilitate the capture and retention of Hill 305. It would also appear almost certain that until these hills are in your possession it will be impossible to land either troops or stores in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay by day.

5. The troops at your disposal will be:

11th Division (less one brigade R.F.A., at Helles).

10th Division (less 29th Infantry Brigade).
Three squadrons, R.N. Armoured Car Division,
R.N.A.S. (one squadron motor cycles, six machine guns; one squadron, Ford cars,
six machine guns; one squadron, armoured cars, six machine guns).
Two Highland Mountain Artillery batteries.

An endeavour will be made to release for your force one or more 5-in. howitzer batteries, now at Anzac, during the day following your initial disembarkation.

6. In order that you may be able to arrange for the disembarkation of your force to agree, so far as Naval exigencies will admit, with the plan of operations on which you decide, the allocation of troops to the ships and boats to be provided by the Navy is left to your decision.

With this object, tables have been drawn up and are enclosed with these instructions, showing the craft which can be placed at your disposal by the Navy, their capacity, and the points at which the troops can be disembarked. The tables also show what numbers of troops, animals, vehicles, and stores can be landed simultaneously.

The beaches available for your landing on the first night are (1) a frontage of 600 yds. in Suvla Bay; (2) a frontage of 1,800 yds. south of Kuchuk Kemikli, called "New Beach" in the tables. It will not be possible in the first instance to land more than one brigade of our force in Suvla Bay, though other vessels can simultaneously be discharging their passengers on New Beach.

7. As regards the time at which the disembarkation may be expected to begin, no craft will be allowed to leave Kephalo Harbour till after dark, and the passage across will take from one and a half to two hours. It is unsafe, therefore, to count on any troops being ashore before 1030 P.M., and in no case must your approach be disclosed to the enemy till 10 p.m., the hour at which the outposts on the left flank of the Anzac position are to be rushed.

8. No allowance has been made in the tables for the disembarkation of your headquarters, as it is not known at what period of the operations you will wish them to land.

9. Special attention is directed to para. 8 of my letter G.S.R. Z. 18, dated 22nd July.

10. The infantry of the 53rd Division will be available as Army reserve, and will be at the disposal of the General Commanding.

11. Special instructions regarding signal communications will be issued later. In general terms, the arrangements will be as follows:

There is a submarine cable between Imbros and Anzac, and a cable will be laid as soon as practicable from Imbros to Suvla Bay. A submarine cable and a land cable will also be laid between Anzac and Suvla Bay as soon as circumstances permit, probably before dawn. Pending the completion of this work, inter-communication between Anzac and Suvla Bay will be carried out by lamp, and subject to Naval approval, between Suvla Bay and Imbros by wireless telegraphy. Two military pack W/T stations and one R.N. base W/T station will be provided at Suvla Bay, four naval ratings will be attached to each station as visual signalling personnel. One of these military pack W/T stations will be disembarked with the second brigade to land, and will act as a base station pending the arrival of the R.N. base wireless station. The second military pack W/T

station will be disembarked with the third brigade to land; it will be placed on a flank and used mainly for fire control under the B.G.R.A.

A wagon wireless station at General Headquarters, Imbros, Will be in communication with both these pack W/T stations.

One officer and 23 other ranks, with two pack animals from the Brigade Signal section, will be landed with each infantry brigade. These parties will lay their cable by hand and establish telephone and vibrator communication from the beach forward. No vehicles will be landed in the first instance, all necessary stores being man-handled. Three officers, 74 other ranks, 28 animals and five vehicles will be landed with Divisional Headquarters. The advance parties will release the brigade sections from the beach and be prepared to lay cable lines by hand.

Two cable wagons will be included in the five vehicles, and should be the first of those vehicles to be disembarked.

As soon as possible after Corps Headquarters go ashore, the personnel of the Divisional Signal Companies will be released from work at the beach.

Arrangements will be made subsequently to disembark an air line detachment and a cable section to provide and pole local lines.

The remainder of the Corps Headquarters Signal Comany will be kept in readiness to be forwarded as soon as Corps Headquarters reports that circumstances admit of its disembarkation.

12. Two Military Landing Officers and their assistant military landing officers will be placed at your disposal from units other than those under your command.

13. In addition to the units mentioned in Tables A. to E. forwarded to you with my letter G.S.R.Z. 18, dated 23rd July, the following are being despatched from Alexandria in this order:

H.Q.R.A., 10th Division.

Two F.A. Brigades, 10th Division (modified scale of horses).

R.A. personnel and ammunition of 10th Divisional Ammunition Park.

One F.A. Brigade, 11th Division (modified scale of horses).

One F.A. Brigade, 10th Division (modified scale of horses).

Two F.A. Brigades, 13th Division.

Horses for 11th Division.

and the following will be assembled at Imbros to land when required:

11th Divisional Cyclist Company (less two platoons).

10th Divisional Cyclist Company.

13th Divisional Cyclist Company

14. You are requested to submit your proposed plan of operations to General Headquarters for approval at the earliest possible date.

W. P. BRAITHWAITE,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.

29th July, 1915.

NOTE

Table 1 would admit of the disembarkation before dawn at and in the neighbourhood of Suvla Bay of:

Divisional Headquarters.	1 Pioneer Battalion.
Signal Co. with 40 horses.	2 Battalions for beach parties and parties and part of Ammn. Park personnel
1 W.T. Section and 2 W/T Stations.	
H.Q., F.A. Bde. (18-pr.) with 10 horses.	2 Platoons Divl. Cyclist Co. and part of Field Ambulances
1 F.A. Battery (18-pr.) with 82 horses.	Bearer sub-divisions of three Field Ambulances and part of Casualty
2 Mountain Batteries with 80 horses.	
3 Field Companies R.E.	
3 Infantry Brigades and part of remainder of F.A. Bde.	Clearing stations.

The 10 motor lighters will land their complements first, and then the troops from the 10 destroyers, the two sloops and their tows, and the trawler and her tows, can proceed simultaneously on a front of about 600 yds. in Suvla Bay and 1,800 on the beach south of Suvla Bay, directly beach secured. The two landing places are about two miles apart. The landing of the troops from H.M.S. "Endymion" and "Theseus" may be able to take place simultaneously, or may have to be deferred until the motor lighters have cleared the destroyers.

Table 2 provides for the disembarkation of all the troops of your command not comprised in Table 1.

APPENDIX E
IX CORPS ORDER FOR THE SUVLA
LANDING

OPERATION ORDER No. 1
BY

LIEUT.-GENERAL THE HON. SIR F. W.
STOPFORD, K.C.M.G., K.C.V.O., C.B.,
COMMANDING IX CORPS

HEADQUARTERS, Imbros,
3rd August, 1915.

1. The main object of the G.O.C. in C. Mediterranean Force is to seize a position across the Gallipoli Peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos, with a protected line of supply from Suvla Bay.

2. The general objective assigned by the G.O.C. in C. to the A. & N.Z. Army Corps is to throw back the right wing of the Turkish Army opposed to it and drive them South towards Kilid Bahr and thus secure a position commanding the narrow part of the Peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos.

For this purpose the A. & N.Z. Army Corps has been temporarily reinforced by units of the IX Corps consisting of the 13th Division, the 29th Infantry Brigade of the 10th Division, as well as by the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade. In order to attract the enemy's reserves to the South an attack will be delivered on the afternoon of August 6th from within the Anzac position against the front and left center of the Turkish line, being specially directed against the enemy's positions about Point 125 (Square 68).

At 1000 P.M. the same evening (August 6th) the enemy's outposts opposite the A. & N.Z. Corps left near the Fisherman's Huts are to be rushed.

A main attack, timed to start about the hour the first troops of the IX Corps are landing, will be directed against Chunuk Bair which it is hoped will reach the summit of the main ridge about 0230 A.M. (soon after moon-rise).

The capture and retention of Sari Bair (Point 305) is essential for the success of the whole undertaking.

3. Troops as per margin, under orders of G.O.C. IX Corps, will secure Suvla Bay as a base of supply. Having accomplished this primary object the G.O.C. IX Corps will endeavor to give direct assistance to the G.O.C., A. & N.Z. Corps in his attack on Hill 305, by an advance on Biyuk

Anafarta, with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of that hill.

The Corps Commander considers that the security of Suvla Bay will not be assured until he is in a position to deny to the enemy the heights which connect Anafarta Sagir and Ejelmer Bay.

4. According to information dated 22nd July, the strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr was estimated at 30,000 men. Of these, 12,000 were reported permanently maintained in the trenches facing the Anzac position. The majority of the remaining 18,000 were then known to be in reserve about Boghali, Koja Dere and Eske Keui (ie. mainly south and south-east of Hill 305).

There were, however, about three battalions located in or about the Anafarta villages, also one battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe, and another at Yilghin Burnu with outposts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba.

A few mounted troops and gendarmerie were also reported in the country North of Anzac and it was considered possible that the hills due East of Suvla Bay in the direction of Ejelmer Bay were held by a party of gendarmerie.

The enemy on the same date had artillery at Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe consisting of one 9-2-inch, one 4-2-inch and 3 field guns. These guns were in emplacements and protected by infantry trenches and wire entanglements. The guns appeared to be, sited so as to direct fire towards the south. Trenches and wire were observed on the southern side of the position; no wire had then been located on the northern side. The enemy may now have more guns in position as three guns, each drawn by six oxen, were recently seen entering, Anafarta Sagir.

Some trenches have also been located about Lala Baba.

5. (a) The embarkation of units of the IX Corps concentrated at Imbros will be carried out under the orders of G.O.C. 11th Division, commencing for personnel on 6th August, for vehicles and stores at such earlier date as may be convenient. The necessary ships and boats, (lists of which have already been prepared and loads detailed) will be assembled in the harbor beforehand, and the embarkation program will be worked out by G.O.C. 11th Division in consultation with Commander Ashby, R.N., who will arrange for the various vessels to be in their allotted positions at the hours arranged. An officer of the Administrative Staff, IX Corps, will be detailed to assist G.O.C. 11th Division.

No craft will be allowed to leave Kephalo until after dark. Passage 1.5 to 2 hours. G.O.C. 11th Division will also be responsible for the allocation to ships and lighters, and for the embarkation of the following units:

At Imbros.

1W/T Section (Nos. W.10 and W.11 Pack Wireless Stations).

2 Anson Battalions, R.N.D. (for duties on the beach).

No.16 Casualty Clearing Station. Headquarters, IX Corps.

In transit
from
Mudros
to Imbros.

1 Casualty Clearing Station.

Units and formations concentrated at Mudros and Mitylene will be embarked for their various

destinations under the orders of I.G.C. in accordance with the program already issued to that officer.

(b) G.O.C. 11th Division will ensure that an officer is appointed Military Transport Officer on every ship for the embarkation of which he is responsible.

(c) The landings of the IX Corps will be referred to as "A", "B" and "C" Beaches.

"A" Beach. Suvla Bay; frontage 600 yards.

"C" Beach. Known also as New Beach. Total

"B" Beach frontage 1800 yards.

"C" and "B" Beaches are practically contiguous.

(d) The following naval and military beach control personnel have been appointed for the landing places of the IX Corps:-

Principal Beach Master

Captain H. F. Talbot, R.N.

Beach Masters

Comdr. I. W. Gibson, M.V.O.
(“A” Beach).

Capt. C. P. Metcalfe, R.N.
(“B” Beach).

Comdr. C. Tindall Carrill Worsley
(“C” Beach).

Asst. Beach Masters and
Beach Lieutenants.

4 Lieutenant Commanders.
10 Lieutenants, R.N.

Principal Military L.O.

Colonel W. G. B. Western, C.B.

Military Landing
Officers.

Major F. W. Peacock, Derbyshire Yeo.
Major Sir R. Baker, Dorset Yeo.
Captain Tylsen Wright, A.S.C.

Assistant
Military
Landing
Officers.

Captain Wade Palmer, Derbyshire Yeo. Military
Captain B. A. Smith, S. Notts. Hussars.
Lieut. H. V. Browne, Dorset Yeo.
Lieut. Krabbe, Berks. Yeo.

The allocation of the above military officers to the various landing places will be detailed by the P.M.L.O. in consultation with the P.B.M.

Special instructions with regard to beach fatigue parties will be issued to those concerned.

The position of “rendezvous” will be selected by divisions concerned and the Beach Staff informed accordingly.

(e) The Chief Engineer, IX Corps, will be in charge of R.E. duties on the beaches and will

supervise the construction of piers and arrangements for storage of water.

The G.O.C. 11th Division will place one field company, R.E., at the disposal of the Chief Engineer for work in connection with these duties.

6. Troops, as per margin, under the command of Major-General F. Hammersley, C.B., will be the first to land.

Details of landing as shown in Table 1, have been worked out in consultation with the Royal Navy and Major-General Hammersley.

With a view to the successful accomplishment of the task allotted to the IX Corps (see para. 3) the force under the orders of Major-General Hammersley, having taken steps to safeguard the landing places referred to in para. 5, will:

(a) Secure the enemy posts at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba and establish a footing on the ridge north-eastwards along the coast through Karakol Dagh and Kiretch Tepc Sirt, thence as far as possible, as Point 156.

(b) Occupy the positions Yilghin Burnu-Ismail Oglu Tepe.

(c) Seize the road junction at Baka Baba and establish connection northwards between this point and such troops as have been detailed under (a) to advance to Point 156.

Subsequent action of the whole force will be governed by a correct appreciation of the situation which is dependent on accurate information of the enemy. This can only be obtained by bold reconnaissance pushed forward by all leading bodies of troops.

It must be impressed upon all officers that negative reports are of equal importance to those conveying definite news.

7. Certain of His Majesty's Ships have been detailed to support the operations ashore with gun fire.

The Brigadier-General R.A., IX Corps. will be in touch with the Senior Officer of the Naval Force allotted to assist the operations, to be carried out under orders of the G.O.C. IX Corps, and will advise as to how best the naval guns can assist the troops on land.

8. The remaining troops at the immediate disposal of the Corps Commander will land as laid down in Table 2.

Their action on landing is dependent on the situation at the time and further orders will be issued accordingly.

9. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of the force is a matter of considerable difficulty. Until such time as some animals can be landed, machine guns, entrenching tools, necessary signalling equipment and medical equipment must be carried by hand. Horses will be landed harnessed. Packs and greatcoats will not be taken; special instructions regarding their disposal will be issued by D.A. & Q.M.G., IX Corps.

Camp kettles will be handed to the Ordnance Officer of the camp at which units concentrate before embarkation. They will be forwarded at first opportunity.

Poles of G.S. wagons will be removed before slinging and made fast to the body of the wagon. Poles of carts, limbers and limbered wagons will not be removed. These vehicles will be so placed in the boats that they will be pole leading.

All ranks will land with two iron rations; animals with full nosebags, filled before embarking. As it is essential that neither man nor beast should commence operations with empty stomachs, arrangements must be made whereby all ranks will be provided with a hot meal, and all animals fed and watered, at the latest opportunity before landing. Owing to the size of the majority of the carrying vessels this will in most cases have to take place prior to embarkation.

A supply depot will be formed by D.S.T. at "A" Beach as soon as supplies can be landed, and will be in charge of Major Huskisson, A.S.C. Senior Supply Officer of divisions will be ordered to place themselves in communication with the officer in charge of the nearest supply depot and to keep him informed of their daily requirements. Supplies will, so far as possible, be handed over to them in bulk at the depot. Owing to the difficulty in landing sufficient animals in the first instance, it is possible that only half rations may be available on the 3rd and 4th day after the operations begin.

It is anticipated that sufficient water for drinking purposes will be found throughout the Anafarta Valley. This will be supplemented by tanks on shore and water bags, but supply by these methods is limited.

General Officers Commanding will issue instructions as regards the picketing of such and springs as may be found, the prevention of waste water therefrom, and for the examination by Medic Officer before its issue.

Too much stress cannot be laid on the importance of warning all ranks to observe the greatest care against waste of ammunition, food or water.

Infantry will carry 200 rounds on the man 3,500 rounds per machine gun in belt boxes.

A reserve of S.A.A. carried by the 11th Division will be stored on "B" Beach. The remainder of the S.A.A. of the 11th Division, that of the 10th Division, and the whole of the gun ammunition will be stored on "A" Beach. Major A.A. Corder, D.A.D.O.S., 11th Division, will be in charge of the Reserve Ammunition, IX Corps, and will arrange, in consultation with the P.M.L.O., for the storing of the reserve ammunition in convenient localities near the beach. Guards for these stores may be found from the beach fatigue parties.

Transport to supplement that in possession of units will be provided by the Corps, from the Indian Mule Corps. The amount of transport for each formation has been calculated to carry rations, water and S.A.A., making one or two trips a day according to the anticipated distance of the various units from the beach.

This transport will be handed over as it is landed, by an officer appointed by the D.S.T., to transport officers of brigades and divisional troops, for allotment as circumstances may require.

Senior transport officers of divisions will be ordered to report to the following representative of the D.S.T. immediately on landing. At "A" Beach Major Badcock, D.A.D.T.

10. Arrangements have been made for the early landing of Bearer Sub-divisions, followed later by Tent Sub-divisions of Field Ambulances.

Two Casualty Clearing Stations will be landed as soon as circumstances permit and will be established at "A" Beach.

Medical Officers will be appointed by G.H.Q. to control these units and to take charge of the arrangements for the evacuation of the wounded from the beach.

The nearest Advance Depot Medical Stores is at Anzac Cove.

11. The various channels of communication which will be established as soon as possible after landing has been effected are given in the attached Table.

The detachment working from "B" Beach towards Anzac, which will be found by IX Corps

Signal Company, will be accompanied by an escort of a section of infantry which will be detailed by the 11th Division.

12. The position of Corps Headquarters and Report Center will be notified later.

H. L. REED,
Br.-General,
General Staff.

Issued at 1100. 3/8/15.

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
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